The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
UNREASONABLE KNOWLEDGE
Open accessAbstract
Peer Reviewed
Overview
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Claims the paper makes
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Citations
Cites
(2000) · Cited by 5,055
Goldman, A. I., & Nozick, R. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184523 · Cited by 2,039
Moser, P. K., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1987) · International Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5840/ipq19872729 · Cited by 1,838
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.
Kornblith, H., & Pollock, J. (1988) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2108001 · Cited by 1,152
Armstrong, D. M. (1973) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511570827 · Cited by 970
Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge
Bonjour, L., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1980) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00396.x · Cited by 556
Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism
Bergmann, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0199275742.001.0001 · Cited by 504
Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for How to Build a Person
Pollock, J. L. (1995) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1887.001.0001 · Cited by 416
How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?
Sosa, E., & University of Arkansas Press (1999) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics1999261/229 · Cited by 235
Knowledge and success from ability
Greco, J. (2009) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9307-0 · Cited by 235
Cited by
Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
Whiting, D. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01905-z · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Aarnio, M. L.
- Venue
- Philosophical Perspectives
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-12
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-21
- ISSN
- 1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2321260478
- Cited by
- 444
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 13.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: UNREASONABLE KNOWLEDGE. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00183.x
- The paper
- Aarnio, M. L. (2010). UNREASONABLE KNOWLEDGE. Philosophical Perspectives. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00183.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
