The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from e Bay
Abstract
Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Resnick, P., Kuwabara, K., Zeckhauser, R., & Friedman, E. (2000) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/355112.355122 · Cited by 2,190 · cited 1×
“For an introduction to the various ways in which reputation systems facilitate trade in otherwise anonymous settings, see Resnick et al. (2000). importance of reputation in theoretical models, empirical work has been hampered by a lack of data.”
Background
Cited by
Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744
The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2 · Cited by 1,118
Pavlou, P. A., & Dimoka, A. (2006) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.1060.0106 · Cited by 930
Park, D.-H., & Kim, S. (2008) · Electronic Commerce Research and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.elerap.2007.12.001 · Cited by 837
How Effective Are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1030.0199 · Cited by 667
Metadata
- Authors
- Houser, D., & Wooders, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-04-27
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 353-369
- ISSN
- 1058-6407 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9134
- OpenAlex
- W2108365287
- Cited by
- 677
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 77.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Houser, D., & Wooders, J. (2006). Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from e Bay. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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