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Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments
Abstract
We investigate the choice to conduct interim performance evaluations in a dynamic tournament. When a worker's ability does not influence the marginal benefit of effort, the choice depends on the shape of the cost of effort function. When effort and ability are complementary, feedback has several competing effects: it informs workers about their relative position in the tournament (evaluation effect) as well as their relative productivity (motivation effect) and it creates signal‐jamming incentives to exert effort prior to the performance evaluation. These effects suggest a tradeoff of performance feedback between evaluation and motivation which is in accordance with organizational behavior research and performance appraisal practices.
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Cites
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Cited by
MANSO, G. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01688.x · Cited by 1,955
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Azmat, G., & Iriberri, N. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.001 · Cited by 390
Feedback, Self-Esteem, and Performance in Organizations
Kuhnen, C. M., & Tymula, A. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1379 · Cited by 261
Metadata
- Authors
- Ederer, F.
- Venue
- Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-09
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 733-769
- ISSN
- 1058-6407 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9134
- OpenAlex
- W3123823159
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 35.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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