The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Politics and Scientific Expertise: Scientists, Risk Perception, and Nuclear Waste Policy
Abstract
To study the homogeneity and influences on scientists’perspectives of environmental risks, we have examined similarities and differences in risk perceptions, particularly regarding nuclear wastes, and policy preferences among 1011 scientists and engineers. We found significant differences (p 0.05)in the patterns of beliefs among scientists from different fields of research. In contrast to physicists, chemists, and engineers, life scientists tend to: (a)perceive the greatest risks from nuclear energy and nuclear waste management; (b)perceive higher levels of overall environmental risk; (c)strongly oppose imposing risks on unconsenting individuals; and (d)prefer stronger requirements for environmental management. On some issues related to priorities among public problems and calls for government action, there are significant variations among life scientists or physical scientists. We also found that–independently of field of research–perceptions of risk and its correlates are significantly associated with the type of institution in which the scientist is employed. Scientists in universities or state and local governments tend to see the risks of nuclear energy and wastes as greater than scientists who work as business consultants, for federal organizations, or for private research laboratories. Significant differences also are found in priority given to environmental risks, the perceived proximity of environmental disaster, willingness to impose risks on an unconsenting population, and the necessity of accepting risks and sacrifices.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Gieryn, T. F. (1983) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2095325 · Cited by 4,838
The Intellectual and Social Organization Of the Sciences
Whitley, R. (2000) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199240531.001.0001 · Cited by 1,076
Weinberg, A. M. (1972) · Minerva · doi:10.1007/bf01682418 · Cited by 624
Cited by
Cultural cognition of scientific consensus.
Kahan, D. M., Jenkins‐Smith, H., & Braman, D. (2011) · Journal of Risk Research · doi:10.1080/13669877.2010.511246 · Cited by 1,686
“Nor is this the only issue on which the emergence of consensus, or near consensus, among scientists has failed to achieve anything close to that among members of the public: the safety of nuclear power (Slovic, Flynn, and Layman 1991 ; Barke and Jenkins‐Smith 1993 ); the toxicity of arsenic, radon, and other groundwat…”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe
Sabatier, P. A. (1998) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501768880000051 · Cited by 1,462
How science makes environmental controversies worse
Sarewitz, D. (2004) · Environmental Science & Policy · doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2004.06.001 · Cited by 1,194
What Determines Trust in Information About Food‐Related Risks? Underlying Psychological Constructs
Frewer, L. J., Howard, C., Hedderley, D., & Shepherd, R. (1996) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.1996.tb01094.x · Cited by 668
Risk interpretation and action: A conceptual framework for responses to natural hazards
Richard Eiser, J., Bostrom, A., Burton, I., Johnston, D. M., McClure, J., Paton, D., van der Pligt, J., & White, M. P. (2012) · International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction · doi:10.1016/j.ijdrr.2012.05.002 · Cited by 599
Metadata
- Authors
- Barke, R. P., & Jenkins‐Smith, H. C.
- Venue
- Risk Analysis
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1993-08
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 425-439
- ISSN
- 0272-4332 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-6924
- OpenAlex
- W2004749260
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 4.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Politics and Scientific Expertise: Scientists, Risk Perception, and Nuclear Waste Policy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1993.tb00743.x
- The paper
- Barke, R. P., & Jenkins‐Smith, H. C. (1993). Politics and Scientific Expertise: Scientists, Risk Perception, and Nuclear Waste Policy. Risk Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1993.tb00743.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.