The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy
Abstract
A major focus of judicial politics research has been the extent to which ideological divergence between the Court and Congress can explain variation in Supreme Court decision making. However, conflicting theoretical and empirical findings have given rise to a significant discrepancy in the scholarship. Building on evidence from interviews with Supreme Court justices and former law clerks, I develop a formal model of judicial‐congressional relations that incorporates judicial preferences for institutional legitimacy and the role of public opinion in congressional hostility towards the Supreme Court. An original dataset identifying all Court‐curbing legislation proposed between 1877 and 2006 is then used to assess the influence of congressional hostility on the Court's use of judicial review. The evidence indicates that public discontent with the Court, as mediated through congressional hostility, creates an incentive for the Court to exercise self‐restraint. When Congress is hostile, the Court uses judicial review to invalidate Acts of Congress less frequently than when Congress is not hostile towards the Court.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Ross, M. J., & Mayhew, D. R. (1975) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447379 · Cited by 4,094
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
The logic of congressional action
(1991) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-4778 · Cited by 1,813
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
Weingast, B. R. (1997) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2952354 · Cited by 1,750
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited
Segal, J. A., & Spaeth, H. J. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615696 · Cited by 1,165
Price, D. E. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400268147 · Cited by 945
The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model revisited
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-6706 · Cited by 857
Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting
CANES-WRONE, B., BRADY, D. W., & COGAN, J. F. (2002) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055402004276 · Cited by 831
Epstein, L., & Knight, D. J. (1997) · Cited by 736
On the Legitimacy of National High Courts
Gibson, J. L., Caldeira, G. A., & Baird, V. A. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585668 · Cited by 686
Cited by
GRAHAM, M. H., & SVOLIK, M. W. (2020) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055420000052 · Cited by 1,044
Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know®
McCarty, N. (2019) · doi:10.1093/wentk/9780190867782.001.0001 · Cited by 280
Democratic Backsliding in the American States: The Case of Judicial Independence
Leonard, M. E. (2024) · Publius: The Journal of Federalism · doi:10.1093/publius/pjae009 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Clark, T. S.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-09-18
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 971-989
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2086552921
- Cited by
- 320
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 143.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00411.x
- The paper
- Clark, T. S. (2009). The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00411.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.