The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule
Abstract
How can autocrats be restrained from rigging elections when they hold a huge military advantage over their opponents? This article suggests that even when opposition parties have no military capacity to win a revolt, opposition unity and a consequent threat of massive civil disobedience can compel autocrats to hold clean elections and leave office by triggering splits within the state apparatus and the defection of the armed forces. Opposition unity can be elite‐driven, when parties unite prior to elections to endorse a common presidential candidate, or voter‐driven, when elites stand divided at the polls and voters spontaneously rebel against fraud. Moreover, the article identifies some conditions under which autocrats will tie their hands willingly not to commit fraud by delegating power to an independent electoral commission. The article develops these ideas through a formal game and the discussion of various case studies.
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Cites
Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy
Lipset, S. M. (1959) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1951731 · Cited by 7,050
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511781353 · Cited by 3,459
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Gandhi, J. (2008) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510090 · Cited by 1,910
The Political Economy of Dictatorship
Wintrobe, R. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174916 · Cited by 1,008
The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Hyde, S. D. (2007) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.0.0001 · Cited by 250
Cited by
Why Electoral Integrity Matters
Norris, P. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107280861 · Cited by 508
Empowering activists or autocrats? The Internet in authoritarian regimes
Rød, E. G., & Weidmann, N. B. (2015) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343314555782 · Cited by 290
Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Allow Citizens to Voice Opinions Publicly?
Chen, J., & Xu, Y. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/690303 · Cited by 242
Metadata
- Authors
- Magaloni, B.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-06-21
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 751-765
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2111102008
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 19.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.