CoChat
Cited by 196

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule

Magaloni, Beatriz · 2010 · American Journal of Political Science

Abstract

How can autocrats be restrained from rigging elections when they hold a huge military advantage over their opponents? This article suggests that even when opposition parties have no military capacity to win a revolt, opposition unity and a consequent threat of massive civil disobedience can compel autocrats to hold clean elections and leave office by triggering splits within the state apparatus and the defection of the armed forces. Opposition unity can be elite‐driven, when parties unite prior to elections to endorse a common presidential candidate, or voter‐driven, when elites stand divided at the polls and voters spontaneously rebel against fraud. Moreover, the article identifies some conditions under which autocrats will tie their hands willingly not to commit fraud by delegating power to an independent electoral commission. The article develops these ideas through a formal game and the discussion of various case studies.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00458.x

Cites

6 of 6 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 196

Metadata

Authors
Magaloni, B.
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2010-06-21
Volume
54
Issue
3
Pages
751-765
ISSN
  • 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-5907
OpenAlex
W2111102008
Cited by
196
References
6
FWCI
19.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00458.x
The paper
Magaloni, B. (2010). The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00458.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.