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Cited by 242Political Conflict and GovernanceGame Theory and Voting SystemsPolitical Theory and Democracy

Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Allow Citizens to Voice Opinions Publicly?

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Chen, Jidong, Xu, Yiqing·2017·The Journal of Politics
DOI 10.1086/690303
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Abstract

Why would an authoritarian regime allow citizens to voice opinions publicly if the exchange of information among citizens spurs social instability as has been often alleged? We show that an authoritarian regime can strengthen its rule by allowing citizens to communicate with one another publicly. From the government’s perspective, such communication serves two interrelated functions. First, if public communication reveals a shared feeling of dissatisfaction toward the government among citizens, the government will detect the danger and improve policies accordingly. Second, public communication disorganizes citizens if they find themselves split over policies. We show that the government allows public communication if and only if it perceives sufficient preference heterogeneity among citizens. The model also illustrates that public communication can serve as a commitment device ensuring government responsiveness when it faces high dissatisfaction, which in turn makes the government better off than with private polling.

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  • The internet can mitigate the information dilemma autocrats face: they want to learn public preferences and grievances to avert unrest while restricting civil liberties and media freedom that would help obtain this information.

    “Finally, the internet can also mitigate the information dilemma autocrats are faced with (Wintrobe, 1998): while they want to learn about public preferences and potential grievances in order to avert threats of unrest (Chen & Xu, 2017; Gunitsky, 2015), they simultaneously restrict civil liberties and media freedom that would help them obtain this information.”

    From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as Chen & Xu, 2017

  • Sites that allow citizens to complain to their governments are not unusual and may benefit regimes by highlighting grassroots conflicts, which may demobilize citizens who otherwise may have been more active on an issue.

    “More generally, sites that allow citizens to complain to their governments are not unusual and also may benefit regimes in other ways too such as highlighting grassroots conflicts, which may demobilize citizens who otherwise may have been more active on an issue (85).”

    From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [85]

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Authors
Chen, J., & Xu, Y.
Affiliations
  • Beijing Normal University (CN)
  • University of California San Diego (US)
ORCID
Venue
The Journal of Politics
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
2017-07
Volume
79
Issue
3
Pages
792-803
ISSN
  • 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2508
DOI
10.1086/690303
OpenAlex
W3122487268
Cited by
242
References
30
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3
FWCI
40.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • The Journal of Politics (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
Keywords
authoritarian regimes, public opinion, citizen communication, preference heterogeneity, government responsiveness, commitment devices, policy responsiveness, political instability, public dissent

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