The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Regulation Dilemma: Cooperation and Conflict in Environmental Governance
Open accessAbstract
Across the United States and around the world, businesses have joined voluntary governmental and nongovernmental environmental regulations. Such codes often require firms to establish internal environmental management systems to improve their environmental performance and regulatory compliance. Meanwhile, governments have been offering incentives to businesses that self‐police their regulatory compliance and promptly report and correct violations. This article examines how governmental regulatory enforcement can influence firms' compliance with mandatory and voluntary regulations. Cooperative regulatory enforcement—in which firms self‐police their environmental operations and governments provide regulatory relief for voluntarily disclosed violations—yields optimal win–win outcomes, but only when both sides cooperate. If firms are likely to evade compliance, governments are better off adopting a deterrence approach. If governments insist on rigidly interpreting and enforcing laws, firms may have incentives to evade regulations and not voluntary codes. Cooperation is possible through credible signals between firms and government.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship
Porter, M. E., & Linde, C. V. D. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.4.97 · Cited by 13,365
Cited by
Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes
Black, J. (2008) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2008.00034.x · Cited by 1,215
Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms' Regulatory Compliance
Potoski, M., & Prakash, A. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00120.x · Cited by 649
Self-citationResearch on Organizations and the Natural Environment, 1992-Present: A Review
Etzion, D. (2007) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206307302553 · Cited by 630
Liu, Y., Wang, A., & Wu, Y. (2021) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126698 · Cited by 449
Covenants with weak swords: ISO 14001 and facilities' environmental performance
Potoski, M., & Prakash, A. (2005) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.1002/pam.20136 · Cited by 436
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Potoski, M., & Prakash, A.
- Venue
- Public Administration Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-03
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 152-163
- ISSN
- 0033-3352 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6210
- OpenAlex
- W2006164615
- Cited by
- 224
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 23.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Regulation Dilemma: Cooperation and Conflict in Environmental Governance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00357.x
- The paper
- Potoski, M., & Prakash, A. (2004). The Regulation Dilemma: Cooperation and Conflict in Environmental Governance. Public Administration Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00357.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.