The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Political Turnout: An International Approach
Abstract
This paper attempts, for the first time, to assess the relationships between budget transparency, fiscal situation, and political turnout using a comparative international approach. With this aim, the authors build a comprehensive index of budget transparency encompassing 40 budget features based on international standards for a sample of 41 countries. They find a positive relationship between national government fiscal balance and budget transparency: The more information the budget discloses, the less the politicians can use fiscal deficits to achieve opportunistic goals. The univariate analysis shows a positive relationship between political turnout and transparency. This result gives some evidence of a positive answer to the question raised by James Alt and David Dreyer Lassen: Does transparency affect political outcomes such as turnout? To some extent, that the more transparent the budget reports are, the more incentives people have to vote. With respect to three variables—transparency, government fiscal balance, and electoral turnout—three clusters of countries arise: low transparency–fiscal imbalance, low transparency–small fiscal imbalance and high transparency–fiscal surplus.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tanzi, V. (1998) · Staff Papers · doi:10.2139/ssrn.882334 · Cited by 2,048
Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles
Rogoff, K. (1987) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2428 · Cited by 1,877
State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics
Poterba, J. M. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261955 · Cited by 1,099
Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes
McKenzie, R. B., Buchanan, J. M., & Wagner, R. E. (1977) · The Journal of Economic Education · doi:10.2307/1182640 · Cited by 1,055
Niskanen, W. A. (1975) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466829 · Cited by 1,022
Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance
Poterba, J. M., & von Hagen, J. (1999) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226676302.001.0001 · Cited by 881
Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States
Knack, S. (2002) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/3088433 · Cited by 617
Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline
von Hagen, J., & Harden, I. J. (1995) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(94)00084-d · Cited by 600
Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries
Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001 · Cited by 584
Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America
Alesina, A., Hausmann, R., Hommes, R., & Stein, E. (1999) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00012-7 · Cited by 510
Cited by
25 Years of Transparency Research: Evidence and Future Directions
Cucciniello, M., Porumbescu, G. A., & Grimmelikhuijsen, S. (2017) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12685 · Cited by 512
Transparency, participation, and accountability practices in open government: A comparative study
Harrison, T. M., & Sayogo, D. S. (2014) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2014.08.002 · Cited by 298
Metadata
- Authors
- Benito, B., & Bastida, F.
- Venue
- Public Administration Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-04-15
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 403-417
- ISSN
- 0033-3352 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6210
- OpenAlex
- W1968509230
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 16.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Political Turnout: An International Approach. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.01988.x
- The paper
- Benito, B., & Bastida, F. (2009). Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Political Turnout: An International Approach. Public Administration Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.01988.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.