A Theory of Capital Structure Relevance under Imperfect Information
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Firms raise debt and equity capital to finance a positive net present value project in perfectly competitive capital markets; firm insiders know the function generating the random firm cash flow but potential capital suppliers do not. Taking into account the incentives of insiders to misrepresent their firm type, capital suppliers attempt to design financing mixes of debt and equity that eliminate the adverse incentives of insiders and correctly price securities. Necessary conditions for a costless separating equilibrium are developed to show that the amount of debt used by a firm is monotonically related to its unobservable true value.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
The Theory of Capital Structure
HARRIS, M., & RAVIV, A. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03753.x · Cited by 4,347
Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information
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Dynamic Capital Structure Choice: Theory and Tests
FISCHER, E. O., HEINKEL, R., & ZECHNER, J. (1989) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02402.x · Cited by 1,571
Self-citationOligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect
Brander, J. A., & Lewis, T. R. (1989) · Cournot Oligopoly · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528231.025 · Cited by 1,073
Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists
ADMATI, A. R., & PFLEIDERER, P. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05146.x · Cited by 723
Metadata
- Authors
- HEINKEL, R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1982-12
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1141-1150
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2144687916
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 6.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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