Cited by 7,569Corporate Finance and GovernanceFinancial Analysis and Corporate GovernanceFinancial Reporting and Valuation Research

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 6 of the 25 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

The Capital Structure Puzzle

Open access
MYERS, STEWART C.·1984·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

The finance and economics literature has at least three "managerial" strands: (1) descriptions of managerial capitalism, in which the separation of ownership and control is taken as a central fact of life, for example Berle and Means [5]; (2) agency theory, pioneered for finance by Jensen and Meckling [18], and (3) the detailed analysis of the personal risks and rewards facing managers and how their responses affect firms' financing or investment choices.For examples of Strand (3), see Ross's articles on financial signalling [36, 37]. 2 Put forward in "Debt and Taxes," [27], esp.pp.272-273.Note that Miller did not claim that all of firms' financing habits are neutral mutations, only that some of them may be.I doubt that Miller intended this idea as a strict null hypothesis (see below).

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03646.x

Cites

47 of 47 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

75 Own interpretation · 13 Sources not found · 3 Supported · 3 Partly supported · 3 No basis given · 2 No full text of the sources · 1 Not checked yet · accuracy not yet measured

Show all 65 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 13
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 24
35 of 35
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Managers have special information that investors do not have.

    “if one starts by assuming that managers have special information, builds a model of how that information changes financing choices, and predicts which choices will be interpreted by investors as good or bad news, then some progress has been made.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The customary assumptions of option pricing models hold when default risk is introduced.

    “Even if default risk is introduced, the absolute value of AN will be less for debt than for equity if we make the customary assumptions of option pricing models.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The firm's manager knows x and y, while investors in capital markets do not and see only a joint distribution of possible values (x, y).

    “The firm's manager knows what x and y are, but investors in capital markets do not: they see only a joint distribution of possible values (x, y).”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Aside from the information asymmetry, capital markets are perfect and semi-strong form efficient.

    “Aside from the information asymmetry, capital markets are perfect and semi-strong form efficient.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    MM's Proposition I holds in the sense that the stock of debt relative to real assets is irrelevant if information available to investors is held constant.

    “MM's Proposition I holds in the sense that the stock of debt relative to real assets is irrelevant if information available to investors is held constant.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Changes in firm value are lognormally distributed.

    “This amounts to assuming that changes in firm value are lognormally distributed, that managers and investors agree on the variance rate, and that managers know the current value of x + y but investors do not.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Managers and investors agree on the variance rate.

    “This amounts to assuming that changes in firm value are lognormally distributed, that managers and investors agree on the variance rate, and that managers know the current value of x + y but investors do not.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Managers know the current value of x + y but investors do not.

    “This amounts to assuming that changes in firm value are lognormally distributed, that managers and investors agree on the variance rate, and that managers know the current value of x + y but investors do not.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    New shares or risky debt would be underpriced in the example.

    “This example assumes that new shares or risky debt would be underpriced.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    If the firm always has a zero-NPV opportunity available to it, the distribution of y is truncated at y = 0.

    “If the firm always has a zero-NPV opportunity available to it, the distribution of y is truncated at y = 0.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    x is non-negative.

    “I also assume that x is non-negative.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The information asymmetry is taken as given.

    “The information asymmetry is taken as given.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The information asymmetry applies to both the investment project and the firm without the project.

    “The information asymmetry applies to both goods-for example, the manager may receive inside information that amounts to good news about x and bad news about y, or vice versa, or good or bad news about both.”
13 of 13

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

2 of 2

Citations

Cites

Show all 43 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Myers S., 1984, The Search for Optimal Capital Structure,, Midland Corporate Finance Journal, 1, 6

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Items 2,401–2,500 of 7,569

Metadata

Authors
MYERS, S. C.
Affiliations
National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
Corresponding author
MYERS, STEWART C.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1984-07
Volume
39
Issue
3
Pages
574-592
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W2170790204
Cited by
7,526
References
43
Citations by year
2026: 117 · 2025: 159 · 2024: 234 · 2023: 324 · 2022: 285 · 2021: 381 · 2020: 413 · 2019: 391 · 2018: 381 · 2017: 342 · 2016: 391 · 2015: 439 · 2014: 394 · 2013: 378 · 2012: 376
FWCI
102.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
The Journal of Finance (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Financial Reporting and Valuation Research
Keywords
capital structure puzzle, managerial capitalism, separation of ownership and control, agency theory, corporate financing decisions, investment decision-making, Modigliani-Miller theorem

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