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Cited by 1,421

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium

JOHN, KOSE, WILLIAMS, JOSEPH·1985·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

A signalling equilibrium with taxable dividends is identified. In this equilibrium, corporate insiders with more valuable private information optimally distribute larger dividends and receive higher prices for their stock whenever the demand for cash by both their firm and its current stockholders exceeds its internal supply of cash. In equilibrium, many firms distribute dividends and simultaneously issue new stock, while other firms pay no dividends. Because dividends reveal all private information not conveyed by corporate audits, current stockholders capture in equilibrium all economic rents net of dissipative signalling costs. Both the announcement effect and the relationship between dividends and cum‐dividend market values are derived explicitly.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02363.x

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Metadata

Authors
JOHN, K., & WILLIAMS, J.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1985-09
Volume
40
Issue
4
Pages
1053-1070
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W2049440762
Cited by
1,421
References
2
FWCI
61.92
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02363.x
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JOHN, K., & WILLIAMS, J. (1985). Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02363.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.