The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Vendor Financing
Abstract
This paper shows that, even in the presence of a perfectly competitive banking industry, it is optimal for firms with market power to engage in vendor financing if credit customers have lower reservation prices than cash customers or if adverse selection makes it infeasible to write credit contracts that separate customers according to their credit risk. We analyze how the advantage of vendor financing depends on the relative size of the cash and credit markets, the heterogeneity of credit customers, and the number of firms in the industry.
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Citations
Cites
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2326770 · Cited by 3,760
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Financial Intermediary-Coalitions
Boyd, J. H., & Prescott, E. C. (1985) · doi:10.21034/sr.87 · Cited by 1,440
Financial intermediary-coalitions
Boyd, J. H., & Prescott, E. C. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90115-8 · Cited by 1,385
Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes
Kreps, D. M., & Scheinkman, J. A. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003636 · Cited by 1,342
Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation
Ramakrishnan, R. T. S., & Thakor, A. V. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297431 · Cited by 1,160
CAPITAL STRUCTURE REARRANGEMENTS AND ME‐FIRST RULES IN AN EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET
Kim, E. H., McConnell, J. J., & Greenwood, P. R. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb01989.x · Cited by 74
Theories of intermediated structures
Townsend, R. M. (1983) · Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy · doi:10.1016/0167-2231(83)90031-3 · Cited by 46
Cited by
Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1997) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/10.3.661 · Cited by 2,593
Trade credit, financial intermediary development and industry growth
Fisman, R., & Love, I. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00527 · Cited by 1,052
Effects of working capital management on SME profitability
Juan García‐Teruel, P., & Martínez‐Solano, P. (2007) · International Journal of Managerial Finance · doi:10.1108/17439130710738718 · Cited by 999
Trade credit and credit rationing
Biais, B., & Gollier, C. (1997) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/10.4.903 · Cited by 982
Trade Credit: Suppliers as Debt Collectors and Insurance Providers
Cuñat, V. (2007) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl015 · Cited by 976
Metadata
- Authors
- BRENNAN, M. J., MAKSIMOVICs, V., & ZECHNER, J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988-12
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1127-1141
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W4239761537
- Cited by
- 394
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Vendor Financing. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03960.x
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- BRENNAN, M. J., MAKSIMOVICs, V., & ZECHNER, J. (1988). Vendor Financing. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03960.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.