The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover
Abstract
This paper examines the hypothesis that an important role of corporate takeovers is to discipline the top managers of poorly performing target firms. We document that the turnover rate for the top manager of target firms in tender offer‐takeovers significantly increases following completion of the takeover and that prior to the takeover these firms were significantly under‐performing other firms in their industry as well as other target firms which had no post‐takeover change in the top executive. We interpret the results to indicate that the takeover market plays an important role in controlling the nonvalue maximizing behavior of top corporate managers.
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Cites
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
Measuring security price performance
Brown, S. J., & Warner, J. B. (1980) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(80)90002-1 · Cited by 3,324
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
Manne, H. G. (1965) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259000 · Cited by 2,364
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
BAKER, G. P., JENSEN, M. C., & MURPHY, K. J. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04593.x · Cited by 1,702
Bradley, M., Desai, A., & Kim, E. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90030-x · Cited by 1,701
Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance
Coughlan, A. T., & Schmidt, R. M. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90027-8 · Cited by 1,209
Corporate takeovers: causes and consequences
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-2781 · Cited by 647
The rationale behind interfirm tender offers
Bradley, M., Desai, A., & Kim, E. H. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90010-7 · Cited by 618
Passing the Baton: Managing the Process of CEO Succession
Vancil, R. F. (1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 545
Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-c · Cited by 4,309
Self-citationINSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A SYNTHESIS OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
Jones, T. M. (1995) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1995.9507312924 · Cited by 3,102
Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS
SMITH, M. P. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05208.x · Cited by 1,288
On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control Mechanisms
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1990.4308826 · Cited by 1,017
Metadata
- Authors
- MARTIN, K. J., & MCCONNELL, J. J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1991-06
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 671-687
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2158074482
- Cited by
- 655
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 49.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- MARTIN, K. J., & MCCONNELL, J. J. (1991). Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02679.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.