The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Short‐Term Objectives Lead to Under‐ or Overinvestment in Long‐Term Projects?
Abstract
We examine managerial investment decisions in the presence of imperfect information and short‐term managerial objectives. Prior research has argued that such an environment induces managers to underinvest in long‐run projects. We show that short‐term objectives and imperfect information may also lead to overinvestment, and we identify how the direction of the distortion depends upon the type of informational imperfection present. When investors cannot observe the level of investment in the long‐run project, suboptimal investment will be induced. When investors can observe investment but not its productivity, however, overinvestment will occur.
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Cites
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Self-citationAgency, Information and Corporate Investment
Stein, J. C. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01006-9 · Cited by 1,347
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Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.006 · Cited by 986
Self-citationCorporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?
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Metadata
- Authors
- BEBCHUK, L. A., & STOLE, L. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1993-06
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 719-729
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2034372432
- Cited by
- 418
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 16.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.