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What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Open accessAbstract
We investigate which provisions, among a set of twenty-four governance provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), are correlated with firm value and stockholder returns. Based on this analysis, we put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions - four constitutional provisions that prevent a majority of shareholders from having their way (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments), and two takeover readiness provisions that boards put in place to be ready for a hostile takeover (poison pills and golden parachutes). We find that increases in the level of this index are monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in firm valuation, as measured by Tobin's Q. We present suggestive evidence that the entrenching provisions cause lower firm valuation. We also find that firms with higher levels of the entrenchment index were associated with large negative abnormal returns during the 1990-2003 period. Moreover, examining all sub-periods of two or more years within this period, we find that a strategy of buying low entrenchment firms and selling short high entrenchment firms out-performs the market in most such periods and does not under-perform the market even in a single sub-period. Finally, we find that the provisions in our entrenchment index fully drive the correlation, identified by prior work, that the IRRC index has with firm value and stock returns. Our results have implications for corporate governance, corporate valuation, and the pricing of governance provisions.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper identifies six entrenching provisions—staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments—that drive the negative correlation between the 24 IRRC governance provisions and firm value. The resulting Entrenchment Index (E index) is monotonically associated with lower Tobin’s Q and negative abnormal stock returns over 1990–2003, while the other 18 IRRC provisions are uncorrelated with either outcome.
Key findings
- In pooled OLS regressions for 1992–2002, the E index coefficient on log industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is −0.044 (significant at 1%), while the O index coefficient is +0.01 (significant at 1%); dummy coefficients for E index levels above zero are negative and monotonically increasing in magnitude, with E index 5–6 at −0.282 in the first specification.
- Each of the six E index provisions has a negative and statistically significant coefficient when controlling for other IRRC provisions: five at the 1% level and one at the 5% level; robustness regressions for each provision are negative and significant at 1% or 5%.
- For 1990–1999, going long E index 0 and short E index 5–6 yielded monthly abnormal returns of 61 basis points equal-weighted and 116 basis points value-weighted (both 1% significance), or compounded annual abnormal returns of 7.4% and 14.8%, respectively.
- For 1990–2003, long E index 0 / short E index 5–6 yielded monthly abnormal returns of 60 basis points (baseline equal-weighted), 66 basis points (industry-adjusted equal-weighted), and 68 basis points (O-bucket-adjusted equal-weighted); value-weighted estimates were 84, 94, and 81 basis points. None of the 16 O-index trading strategies generated statistically significant abnormal returns, even at the 10% level.
Methods
- Data come from six IRRC volumes (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2002), each covering 1,400–1,800 firms and more than 90% of U.S. stock market capitalization, plus Compustat, CRSP, and ExecuComp; dual-class firms and REITs are excluded.
- The E index assigns one point for each of six provisions (score 0–6); the O index assigns one point for each of the other 18 IRRC provisions. Firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q, using the Kaplan–Zingales/Gompers–Ishii–Metrick definition, with log industry-adjusted Q as the main dependent variable.
- Analyses include pooled OLS with White robust standard errors, firm fixed effects, annual and Fama–MacBeth regressions, median regressions, and long-short portfolio tests using the Carhart four-factor model, industry-adjusted returns, and O-bucket-adjusted returns for 1990–1999 and 1990–2003.
Limitations
- The paper states that its evidence does not establish causality; simultaneity remains possible, and the direction of causation calls for further examination. It also notes that the equal-weight index construction ignores possible differences in provision weights and interactions among provisions.
- The paper cautions that co-linearity may understate individual entrenching provision coefficients, and that it cannot rule out that some O-index provisions are negatively correlated with firm value but diluted or counteracted; pension parachute results are mixed.
- Evident from the text: IRRC data are not annual, so the authors assume provisions reported in a volume remain in place until the next volume; entrenchment data before 1990 are unavailable, and the sample excludes dual-class firms and REITs.
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3 Valid · 3 Not valid · 27 Not checked · 152 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“As Black, Cheffins, and Klausner (2006) powerfully argue and document, directors are protected from personal liability by myriad factors.”
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > C. Discussion of the other provisions
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Black, Cheffins, and Klausner (2006) source
In “C. The Bottom Line,” the paper attributes the low incidence of outside directors’ out-of-pocket liability to an interaction of legal rules, indemnification, D&O insurance, and settlement incentives. This supports the citing sentence’s broad paraphrase, though the paper’s analysis focuses on outside directors rather than claiming they can never be personally liable. (LLM, conf=0.90)
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In the paper
“Following the initial finding by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) of correlation between the GIM index and lower stock returns during the period 1990-1999, subsequent work did not find such correlation in a period extended forward to include the beginning of this decade [Cremers and Nair (2005)].”
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > B. The E index and returns for 1990-2003
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Cremers and Nair (2005) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
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In the paper
“13 provisions were not the target of even a single precatory resolution during the 2003 and 2004 proxy seasons;”
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > A. The provisions garnering significant shareholder opposition
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“The resolutions, most of which were initiated by the same individual who submitted the same resolutions at many companies, passed in a mere 7% of the cases in which votes on them were held.”
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > A. The provisions garnering significant shareholder opposition
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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In the paper
“All the other 18 IRRC provisions do not come even close to the above six IRRC provisions in terms of being the target of a significant number of opposing resolutions obtaining majority support among shareholders.”
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > A. The provisions garnering significant shareholder opposition
plainn = 17- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Claims other papers make about this one
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In the citing paper
“There is overwhelming and robust evidence that better governance is associated with better financial performance and higher firm value”
From A review on ESG investing: Investors' expectations, beliefs and perceptions (2024) · cites this paper as Bebchuk et al., 2009
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Bebchuk et al. (2009), Derwall et al. (2004), Gompers et al. (2003), In et al. (2019), and Pastor et al. (2022) document a positive relationship between a firm's ESG profile and its equity returns, whileAswani et al. (2023) find no significant relationship.”
From A review on ESG investing: Investors' expectations, beliefs and perceptions (2024) · cites this paper as Bebchuk et al. (2009)
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In the paper
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
“Regression Type (4) 0.03 5** -0.035 -0.009 0.004 0.027 *** -0.031 0.015 0.033 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.021”
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > TABLE X MONTHLY ABNORMAL RETURNS ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT TRADING STRATEGIES: THE 1990S
“Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > I. INTRODUCTION
“We find no evidence that the eighteen provisions not in the E index are negatively correlated, either in the aggregate or individually, with Tobin's Q.”
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > B. Individual provisions: looking inside the two indexes
“With respect to one provision in the O index, pension parachutes, its coefficient is not statistically significant in regression type (4), negative and significant at the 10% level in regression types (2) and (3), and negative and significant at the 5% level in regression type (1).”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
“Fama-Macbeth -0.03 *** 0.006 *** -0.038 *** 0.001 *** -0.102 *** 0.014 *** 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.027 0.006”
§ What Matters in Corporate Governance? > TABLE X MONTHLY ABNORMAL RETURNS ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT TRADING STRATEGIES: THE 1990S
“Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.”
Citations
Cites
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Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?
Kaplan, S. N., & Zingales, L. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555163 · Cited by 6,770
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(96)00896-3 · Cited by 5,669
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
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Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Georgeson Shareholder. Annual Corporate Governance Review 2003. http://www.georgeson.com/usa/resources_research.php (accessed November 14, 2008).
- Georgeson Shareholder. Annual Corporate Governance Review 2004. http://www.georgeson.com/usa/resources_research.php (accessed November 14, 2008).
- Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002). Corporate Takeover Defenses. Washington: D.C.
Cited by
LINS, K. V., SERVAES, H., & TAMAYO, A. (2017) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12505 · Cited by 3,794
Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital?
El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Kwok, C. C. Y., & Mishra, D. R. (2011) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.02.007 · Cited by 3,465
Endogeneity in Empirical Corporate Finance1
Roberts, M. R., & Whited, T. M. (2013) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/b978-0-44-453594-8.00007-0 · Cited by 2,459
Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M., & Matos, P. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.018 · Cited by 1,631
Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility
Jo, H., & Harjoto, M. A. (2011) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0869-y · Cited by 1,600
Metadata
- Authors
- Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Corresponding author
- Bebchuk, Lucian
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-11-27
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 783-827
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W4251380393
- Cited by
- 2,906
- References
- 53
- Citations by year
- 2026: 146 · 2025: 207 · 2024: 224 · 2023: 173 · 2022: 181 · 2021: 190 · 2020: 204 · 2019: 194 · 2018: 200 · 2017: 206 · 2016: 165 · 2015: 149 · 2014: 146 · 2013: 122 · 2012: 133
- FWCI
- 283.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- nrs.harvard.edu
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Review of Financial Studies (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Keywords
- corporate governance, staggered boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements, business valuation, abnormal returns, investor protection
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