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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 69 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 36 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

What Matters in Corporate Governance?

Open access
Bebchuk, Lucian, Cohen, Alma, Ferrell, Allen · 2009 · Review of Financial Studies

Abstract

We investigate which provisions, among a set of twenty-four governance provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), are correlated with firm value and stockholder returns. Based on this analysis, we put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions - four constitutional provisions that prevent a majority of shareholders from having their way (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments), and two takeover readiness provisions that boards put in place to be ready for a hostile takeover (poison pills and golden parachutes). We find that increases in the level of this index are monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in firm valuation, as measured by Tobin's Q. We present suggestive evidence that the entrenching provisions cause lower firm valuation. We also find that firms with higher levels of the entrenchment index were associated with large negative abnormal returns during the 1990-2003 period. Moreover, examining all sub-periods of two or more years within this period, we find that a strategy of buying low entrenchment firms and selling short high entrenchment firms out-performs the market in most such periods and does not under-perform the market even in a single sub-period. Finally, we find that the provisions in our entrenchment index fully drive the correlation, identified by prior work, that the IRRC index has with firm value and stock returns. Our results have implications for corporate governance, corporate valuation, and the pricing of governance provisions.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper identifies six entrenching provisions—staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments—that drive the negative correlation between the 24 IRRC governance provisions and firm value. The resulting Entrenchment Index (E index) is monotonically associated with lower Tobin’s Q and negative abnormal stock returns over 1990–2003, while the other 18 IRRC provisions are uncorrelated with either outcome.

Key findings

  • In pooled OLS regressions for 1992–2002, the E index coefficient on log industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is −0.044 (significant at 1%), while the O index coefficient is +0.01 (significant at 1%); dummy coefficients for E index levels above zero are negative and monotonically increasing in magnitude, with E index 5–6 at −0.282 in the first specification.
  • Each of the six E index provisions has a negative and statistically significant coefficient when controlling for other IRRC provisions: five at the 1% level and one at the 5% level; robustness regressions for each provision are negative and significant at 1% or 5%.
  • For 1990–1999, going long E index 0 and short E index 5–6 yielded monthly abnormal returns of 61 basis points equal-weighted and 116 basis points value-weighted (both 1% significance), or compounded annual abnormal returns of 7.4% and 14.8%, respectively.
  • For 1990–2003, long E index 0 / short E index 5–6 yielded monthly abnormal returns of 60 basis points (baseline equal-weighted), 66 basis points (industry-adjusted equal-weighted), and 68 basis points (O-bucket-adjusted equal-weighted); value-weighted estimates were 84, 94, and 81 basis points. None of the 16 O-index trading strategies generated statistically significant abnormal returns, even at the 10% level.

Methods

  • Data come from six IRRC volumes (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2002), each covering 1,400–1,800 firms and more than 90% of U.S. stock market capitalization, plus Compustat, CRSP, and ExecuComp; dual-class firms and REITs are excluded.
  • The E index assigns one point for each of six provisions (score 0–6); the O index assigns one point for each of the other 18 IRRC provisions. Firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q, using the Kaplan–Zingales/Gompers–Ishii–Metrick definition, with log industry-adjusted Q as the main dependent variable.
  • Analyses include pooled OLS with White robust standard errors, firm fixed effects, annual and Fama–MacBeth regressions, median regressions, and long-short portfolio tests using the Carhart four-factor model, industry-adjusted returns, and O-bucket-adjusted returns for 1990–1999 and 1990–2003.

Limitations

  • The paper states that its evidence does not establish causality; simultaneity remains possible, and the direction of causation calls for further examination. It also notes that the equal-weight index construction ignores possible differences in provision weights and interactions among provisions.
  • The paper cautions that co-linearity may understate individual entrenching provision coefficients, and that it cannot rule out that some O-index provisions are negatively correlated with firm value but diluted or counteracted; pension parachute results are mixed.
  • Evident from the text: IRRC data are not annual, so the authors assume provisions reported in a volume remain in place until the next volume; entrenchment data before 1990 are unavailable, and the sample excludes dual-class firms and REITs.

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Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1093/rfs/hhn099

Cites

69 of 69 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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3 Valid · 3 Not valid · 27 Not checked · 152 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Georgeson Shareholder. Annual Corporate Governance Review 2003. http://www.georgeson.com/usa/resources_research.php (accessed November 14, 2008).
  2. Georgeson Shareholder. Annual Corporate Governance Review 2004. http://www.georgeson.com/usa/resources_research.php (accessed November 14, 2008).
  3. Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002). Corporate Takeover Defenses. Washington: D.C.

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Metadata

Authors
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
Corresponding author
Bebchuk, Lucian
Venue
Review of Financial Studies
Published
2008-11-27
Volume
22
Issue
2
Pages
783-827
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
OpenAlex
W4251380393
Cited by
2,906
References
53
Citations by year
2026: 146 · 2025: 207 · 2024: 224 · 2023: 173 · 2022: 181 · 2021: 190 · 2020: 204 · 2019: 194 · 2018: 200 · 2017: 206 · 2016: 165 · 2015: 149 · 2014: 146 · 2013: 122 · 2012: 133
FWCI
283.13
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Review of Financial Studies (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
Keywords
corporate governance, staggered boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements, business valuation, abnormal returns, investor protection

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What Matters in Corporate Governance? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rfs/hhn099
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Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009). What Matters in Corporate Governance? Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn099

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