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Cited by 615

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?

Oyer, Paul·2004·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

This paper illustrates why firms might choose to implement stock option plans or other pay instruments that reward “luck.” I consider a model where adjusting compensation contracts is costly and where employees' outside opportunities are correlated with their firms' performance. The model may help to explain the use and recent rise of broad‐based stock option plans, as well as other financial instruments, even when these pay plans have no effect on employees' on‐the‐job behavior. The model suggests that agency theory's often‐overlooked participation constraint may be an important determinant of some common compensation schemes, particularly for employees below the highest executive ranks.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00674.x

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Metadata

Authors
Oyer, P.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2004-08
Volume
59
Issue
4
Pages
1619-1650
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W2158100648
Cited by
615
References
32
FWCI
109.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00674.x
The paper
Oyer, P. (2004). Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects? The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00674.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.