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Cash and Corporate Control
Open accessAbstract
The takeover market is often suggested as appropriate for containing the agency problems of excessive corporate cash holdings. However, recent studies report contradictory evidence. I focus on the takeover‐deterrence effects of corporate liquidity and suggest the proxy contest as an effective alternative control mechanism. I find that proxy fight targets hold 23% more cash than comparable firms, and that the probability of a contest is significantly increasing in excess cash holdings. Proxy fight announcement return also is positively related to excess cash. Following a contest, executive turnover and special cash distributions to shareholders increase, while cash holdings significantly decline.
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Cites
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Cited by
Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US
Harford, J., Mansi, S. A., & Maxwell, W. F. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.04.002 · Cited by 1,725
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors
KLEIN, A., & ZUR, E. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01432.x · Cited by 832
The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States*
Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2007) · Journal of Applied Corporate Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6622.2007.00125.x · Cited by 816
Growing out of trouble? Corporate responses to liability risk
Gormley, T. A., & Matsa, D. A. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr011 · Cited by 690
Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment
Faleye, O. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.01.005 · Cited by 550
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- FALEYE, O.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-10
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2041-2060
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2127397261
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 22.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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