The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans
Open accessAbstract
I empirically explore the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers influences syndicate structure and on which lenders become syndicate members. Consistent with moral hazard in monitoring, the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. When information asymmetry between the borrower and lenders is potentially severe, participant lenders are closer to the borrower, both geographically and in terms of previous lending relationships. Lead bank and borrower reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate information asymmetry problems.
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Citations
Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1988) · Unknown · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.292693 · Cited by 4,386
The financial accelerator, and the flight to quality
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., & Gilchrist, S. (1996) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/2109844 · Cited by 2,351
Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00223 · Cited by 1,590
Cited by
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency
García Lara, J. M., García Osma, B., & Penalva, F. (2016) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.07.003 · Cited by 659
COSTELLO, A. M., & WITTENBERG‐MOERMAN*, R. (2011) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2010.00388.x · Cited by 555
Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.670543 · Cited by 455
COLLA, P., IPPOLITO, F., & LI, K. (2013) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12052 · Cited by 409
Metadata
- Authors
- SUFI, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-03-20
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 629-668
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2133670123
- Cited by
- 1,566
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 105.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- SUFI, A. (2007). Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01219.x
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