The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOs
Open accessAbstract
We explore how compensation policies following mergers affect a CEO's incentives to pursue a merger. We find that even in mergers where bidding shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of the time. Following a merger, a CEO's pay and overall wealth become insensitive to negative stock performance, but a CEO's wealth rises in step with positive stock performance. Corporate governance matters; bidding firms with stronger boards retain the sensitivity of their CEOs' compensation to poor performance following the merger. In comparison, we find that CEOs are not rewarded for undertaking major capital expenditures.
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The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
Cited by
Sustainability of CEO and Employee Compensation Divide: Evidence from USA
Aggarwal, V., & Doifode, A. (2023) · Lecture Notes on Data Engineering and Communications Technologies · doi:10.1007/978-981-19-1844-5_35 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- HARFORD, J., & LI, K.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-03-20
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 917-949
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2034403759
- Cited by
- 580
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 64.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- HARFORD, J., & LI, K. (2007). Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOs. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01227.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
