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Liquidity Coinsurance, Moral Hazard, and Financial Contagion

BRUSCO, SANDRO, CASTIGLIONESI, FABIO · 2007 · The Journal of Finance

Abstract

We study the propagation of financial crises among regions in which banks are protected by limited liability and may take excessive risk. The regions are affected by negatively correlated liquidity shocks, so liquidity coinsurance is Pareto improving. The moral hazard problem can be solved if banks are sufficiently capitalized. Under autarky a limited amount of capital is sufficient to prevent risk‐taking, but when financial markets are open capital becomes insufficient. Thus, bankruptcy occurs with positive probability and the crisis spreads to other regions via financial linkages. Opening financial markets is nevertheless Pareto improving; consumers benefit from liquidity coinsurance, although they pay the cost of excessive risk‐taking.

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Metadata

Authors
BRUSCO, S., & CASTIGLIONESI, F.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2007-09-04
Volume
62
Issue
5
Pages
2275-2302
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W2137112132
Cited by
194
References
0
FWCI
14.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Liquidity Coinsurance, Moral Hazard, and Financial Contagion. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01275.x
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BRUSCO, S., & CASTIGLIONESI, F. (2007). Liquidity Coinsurance, Moral Hazard, and Financial Contagion. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01275.x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.