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Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?
Open accessAbstract
Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker‐level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict‐inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with employees. Our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for employee compensation.
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Cites
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Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices
Edmans, A. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.021 · Cited by 2,511
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Deng, X., Kang, J.-K., & Low, B. S. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.04.014 · Cited by 1,647
Edmans, A. (2023) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/fima.12413 · Cited by 531
Financial Reporting Quality and Labor Investment Efficiency
Jung, B., Lee, W., & Weber, D. P. (2014) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12053 · Cited by 451
Stakeholder welfare and firm value
Jiao, Y. (2010) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.04.013 · Cited by 438
Metadata
- Authors
- CRONQVIST, H., HEYMAN, F., NILSSON, M., SVALERYD, H., & VLACHOS, J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-01-23
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 309-339
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3125291865
- Cited by
- 462
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 29.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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