The DOI matches its Crossref record; 67 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia
Open accessAbstract
This paper analyzes how blockholders can exert governance even if they cannot intervene in a firm's operations. Blockholders have strong incentives to monitor the firm's fundamental value because they can sell their stakes upon negative information. By trading on private information (following the “Wall Street Rule”), they cause prices to reflect fundamental value rather than current earnings. This in turn encourages managers to invest for long‐run growth rather than short‐term profits. Contrary to the view that the U.S.'s liquid markets and transient shareholders exacerbate myopia, I show that they can encourage investment by impounding its effects into prices.
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Cites
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
Kyle, A. S. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913210 · Cited by 9,580
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Kline, J. V., Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1933) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1115736 · Cited by 7,361
The economic implications of corporate financial reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information
MERTON, R. C. (1987) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04565.x · Cited by 5,811
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The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment BehaviorPreprint
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Do institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? International evidence
Dyck, A., Lins, K. V., Roth, L., & Wagner, H. F. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.08.013 · Cited by 2,547
Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices
Edmans, A. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.021 · Cited by 2,511
Self-citationBehind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors
McCAHERY, J. A., SAUTNER, Z., & STARKS, L. T. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12393 · Cited by 1,494
Does Stock Liquidity Enhance or Impede Firm Innovation?
FANG, V. W., TIAN, X., & TICE, S. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12187 · Cited by 1,339
Corporate governance and blockchains
Yermack, D. (2017) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfw074 · Cited by 1,082
Metadata
- Authors
- EDMANS, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-11-25
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2481-2513
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2141003613
- Cited by
- 1,258
- References
- 67
- FWCI
- 171.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.