The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors
Open accessAbstract
We study the relation between opportunistic timing of option grants and corporate governance failures, focusing on “lucky” grants awarded at the lowest price of the grant month. Option grant practices were designed to provide lucky grants not only to executives but also to independent directors. Lucky grants to both CEOs and directors were the product of deliberate choices, not of firms’ routines, and were timed to make them more profitable. Lucky grants are associated with higher CEO compensation from other sources, no majority of independent directors, no outside blockholder on the compensation committee, and a long‐serving CEO.
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Cites
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
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Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
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Research works printed but not linked: 11
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Cited by
Bebchuk, L. A., Cremers, K. J. M., & Peyer, U. C. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006 · Cited by 993
Self-citationOptimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities
Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Stantcheva, S. (2014) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.6.1.230 · Cited by 713
Corruption culture and corporate misconduct
Liu, X. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.06.005 · Cited by 580
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There
Murphy, K. J. (2013) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/b978-0-44-453594-8.00004-5 · Cited by 535
Metadata
- Authors
- BEBCHUK, L. A., GRINSTEIN, Y., & PEYER, U.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-11-09
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2363-2401
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2107222289
- Cited by
- 348
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 133.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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