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Cited by 235

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited

Open access
GUTHRIE, KATHERINE, SOKOLOWSKY, JAN, WAN, KAM‐MING · 2012 · The Journal of Finance

Abstract

Chhaochharia and Grinstein estimate that CEO pay decreases 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/Nasdaq board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers of 865 sample firms. In addition, we find that the compensation committee independence requirement increases CEO total pay, particularly in the presence of effective shareholder monitoring. Our evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining CEO pay as suggested by the managerial power hypothesis.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01744.x

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Metadata

Authors
GUTHRIE, K., SOKOLOWSKY, J., & WAN, K.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2012-05-21
Volume
67
Issue
3
Pages
1149-1168
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W3125954083
Cited by
235
References
2
FWCI
84.92
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01744.x
The paper
GUTHRIE, K., SOKOLOWSKY, J., & WAN, K. (2012). CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01744.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.