The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited
Open accessAbstract
Chhaochharia and Grinstein estimate that CEO pay decreases 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/Nasdaq board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers of 865 sample firms. In addition, we find that the compensation committee independence requirement increases CEO total pay, particularly in the presence of effective shareholder monitoring. Our evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining CEO pay as suggested by the managerial power hypothesis.
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Cites
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839588 · Cited by 10,641
CEO Compensation and Board Structure
CHHAOCHHARIA, V., & GRINSTEIN, Y. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x · Cited by 611
Cited by
The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: Evidence from China
GIANNETTI, M., LIAO, G., & YU, X. (2015) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12198 · Cited by 851
Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK
Ferri, F., & Maber, D. A. (2013) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfs003 · Cited by 387
Influential Observations and Inference in Accounting Research
Leone, A. J., Minutti-Meza, M., & Wasley, C. E. (2019) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-52396 · Cited by 377
Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers
Guo, L., & Masulis, R. W. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv038 · Cited by 332
Public Opinion and Executive Compensation
Kuhnen, C. M., & Niessen, A. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1490 · Cited by 305
Metadata
- Authors
- GUTHRIE, K., SOKOLOWSKY, J., & WAN, K.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-05-21
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1149-1168
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3125954083
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 84.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- GUTHRIE, K., SOKOLOWSKY, J., & WAN, K. (2012). CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01744.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.