The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Public Opinion and Executive Compensation
Open accessAbstract
We investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992–2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pay such as salary, although overall compensation does not change. The reduction in option pay after increased press negativity is more pronounced when firms, CEOs, and boards have stronger reputation concerns. Our within-firm, within-year identification shows the results cannot be explained by annual changes in accounting rules regarding executive compensation, stock market conditions, or pay mean reversion. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.
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Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
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When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10‐Ks
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Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review
Blankespoor, E., deHaan, E., & Marinovic, I. (2020) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101344 · Cited by 1,076
Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from natural experiments
Chen, T., Harford, J., & Lin, C. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.002 · Cited by 747
Comparing automated text classification methods
Hartmann, J., Huppertz, J., Schamp, C., & Heitmann, M. (2019) · International Journal of Research in Marketing · doi:10.1016/j.ijresmar.2018.09.009 · Cited by 399
Local investors and corporate governance
Chhaochharia, V., Kumar, A., & Niessen-Ruenzi, A. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.03.002 · Cited by 268
Heese, J., Pérez-Cavazos, G., & Peter, C. D. (2022) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.08.015 · Cited by 267
Metadata
- Authors
- Kuhnen, C. M., & Niessen, A.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2012-07
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1249-1272
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2120727421
- Cited by
- 305
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 79.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
