The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How Do Franchise Contracts Evolve? A Study of Three German SMEs*
Abstract
Although contracts are crucial for franchisors in managing relationships with franchisees, franchising research has not adequately investigated whether and how franchisors learn about effective contracts. This paper explores the evolution of formal contracts used by three German chains from the restaurant, hotel, and retailing industries. We describe the nature of learning involved in designing contracts in the sampled chains, and suggest reasons why contracts change over time. Despite the fact that drafting contracts with independent entrepreneurs is one of the important tasks the franchisor is rewarded for, we found that franchisors remain boundedly rational and therefore are unable to completely anticipate undesirable franchisee behavior and to incorporate suitable safeguards. We develop propositions to suggest that: (1) learning explains contract design capability better than does foresight, (2) a new management and the pursuit of uniformity lead to contract changes, and (3) the presence of an active franchisee council promotes the efficiency of the contract change process. We offer implications of our findings for theory, practice, and research.
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“Although contracts play a major role in managing relationships with franchisees, franchising research has largely taken them for granted (Cochet and Garg, 2008).”
From Entrepreneurial orientation and the franchise system (2013) · cites this paper as Cochet and Garg, 2008
In the citing paper
“Although contracts play a major role in managing relationships with franchisees, franchising research has largely taken them for granted (Cochet and Garg, 2008).”
From Entrepreneurial orientation and the franchise system (2013) · cites this paper as Cochet and Garg, 2008
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Blair, R. D., & Lafontaine, F. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511753879 · Cited by 364
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Entrepreneurial orientation and the franchise system
Dada, O. (., & Watson, A. (2013) · European Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1108/03090561311306877 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Cochet, O., & Garg, V. K.
- Affiliations
- University of Münster (DE)
- Missouri State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Garg, Vinay Kumar
- Venue
- Journal of Small Business Management
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2008-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 134-151
- ISSN
- 0047-2778 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-627X
- OpenAlex
- W2064555608
- Cited by
- 72
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 16.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Small Business Management (publishedVersion)
- BearWorks (Missouri State University) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Franchising Strategies and Performance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management of Technology and Innovation › Entrepreneurship Studies and Influences
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Management and Organizational Studies
- Keywords
- franchising, franchise agreements, contract design, bounded rationality, organizational learning, franchisors, small and medium-sized enterprises, restaurant chains, hotel chains, retail chains, management change, uniformity
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