Explanatory Pluralism in Cognitive Science
Open accessAbstract
This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that "framework debate" in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled by these points to explore existing literature on the topic. Despite this literature, pluralism has garnered very little attention from broader cognitive science. We end by briefly considering what it might mean for theoretical cognitive science.
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Proponents of the ecological approach have argued for pluralism within cognitive science in order to make room for ecological psychology.
“Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology.”
From Productive pluralism: The coming of age of ecological psychology. (2024) · cites this paper as Dale et al., 2009
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Explanatory pluralism: An unrewarding prediction error for free energy theorists
Colombo, M., & Wright, C. (2017) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2016.02.003 · Cited by 67 · see citing works
Productive pluralism: The coming of age of ecological psychology.
Bruineberg, J., Withagen, R., & van Dijk, L. (2024) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000438 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
- Authors
- Dale, R., Dietrich, E., & Chemero, A.
- Affiliations
- Binghamton University (US)
- Franklin & Marshall College (US)
- Corresponding author
- Dale, Rick
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-06-22
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 739-742
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2127398787
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 11
- FWCI
- 8.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
- Keywords
- explanatory pluralism, cognitive science theory, theoretical integration, theoretical pluralism, cognitive processes
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