Productive pluralism: The coming of age of ecological psychology.
Open accessPublished version of a preprint
Abstract
The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition. The concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science. Yet, contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy. Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a "package deal"-a principled and unified perspective on perception and action. Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways. Aiming to open the field to critical engagement and productive exchange, we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson's death: physical, biological, and social ecological psychology. Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, adopting different explanatory principles, and embodying different philosophical worldviews. Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology. Given the diversity of the strands, we extend this plea to within ecological psychology itself; the field is better off aiming for a productive pluralism in which the different strands are in dialogue with each other. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
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Claims the paper makes
5 of 81 cited sources checked · 1 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Proponents of the social and the physical approaches have criticized enactivism for very different reasons.
“Conversely, although proponents of the social and the physical approach have been critical of enactivism, they have done so for very different reasons (cf.Fultot et al., 2016;Heft, 2020).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Fultot et al., 2016
- cites Heft, 2020 source
Heft critiques enaction theory from an ecological-psychology perspective, identifying disagreements about sensations, information, and organism boundaries (Concluding Comments; page not indicated). The paper does not discuss proponents of a social approach criticizing enactivism or compare their reasons with those of the ecological approach. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Chemero (2009) and Baggs and Chemero (2021) bring the physical and biological approaches closer together in order to better cope with social phenomena.
“Chemero (2009) and Baggs and Chemero (2021), on the other hand, bring the physical and the biological approach closer together so as to better cope with social phenomena.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Chemero, 2009 source
- cites Baggs & Chemero, 2021 source
The Abstract proposes a synthesis of ecological psychology and enactivism, and §3.2 applies the framework to social perception and enculturation. The paper does not, however, state that better handling social phenomena is the purpose of bringing the approaches together. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Findingnone given
A pluralist spirit in ecological psychology has never entirely disappeared.
“Although not visible to many psychologists and cognitive scientists (including Dennett (2017)), the pluralist spirit in ecological psychology has never completely ceased.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingnone given
Three major strands of ecological psychology-physical, biological and social-each emerged in the twenty years after Gibson's death.
“we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson's death: physical, biological and social ecological psychology.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
Ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways.
“Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingcitation
The physical line of ecological psychology drew inspiration from theories of open systems far from equilibrium.
“the physical line of ecological psychology took inspiration from theories that deal with open systems that are far from equilibrium (Haken, 1978;Prigogine, 1980; see e.g., Kugler et al., 1980;Kugler & Turvey, 1988).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Haken, 1978
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Prigogine, 1980
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Findingnone given
Biological ecological psychology is firmly rooted in Darwin's evolutionary biology.
“Biological ecological psychology is firmly rooted in Darwin's evolutionary biology.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingcitation
Biological ecological psychology is most strongly articulated in the work of Edward Reed.
“A second line of thought is biological ecological psychology, most strongly articulated in the work of Edward Reed (Reed, 1982b(Reed, , 1988(Reed, , 1996)).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Reed, 1982b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Reed, 1988 source
- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Findingreasoning
Reed was inconsistent in how he used the concept of affordances in his work.
“Yet, and as further explicated in the section The Social and the Biological, Reed was not consistent in the way he used the concept of affordances in his work.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The paper's analysis of ecological psychology's formative years identified three major strands of thought: physical ecological psychology, biological ecological psychology, and social ecological psychology.
“Our analysis of the formative years of ecological psychology identified three major strands of thought: physical ecological psychology, biological ecological psychology and social ecological psychology.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The three strands identified (physical, biological, and social ecological psychology) are the major lines of thought in post-Gibsonian ecological psychology.
- Findingcitation
At some points Reed defended a selectionist view in which the environment, replete with affordances, exists prior to the origin of the species.
“At some points, Reed defended a genuine selectionist view of evolution in which the environment (repleted with affordances) exists prior to the origin of the species.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
The ecological approach to psychology has been a principal forerunner of embodied and situated approaches to cognition.
“The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
The ambient optical flow field contains an optical variable relating the optical expansion of the water's surface one-to-one to the time remaining before contact.
“this optical flow field contains, among other things, an optical variable that relates the optical expansion of the water's surface one-to-one to the time remaining before the gannet contacts the surface.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lee, 1976 source
- Premisereasoning
Animals perceive the environment directly, without mediating representational states inside the animal.
“This leads to a second and perhaps the most famous and disputed aspect of ecological psychology: the assertion that animals perceive the environment directly.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites J.J. Gibson, 1979
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
The aspects of the environment that are perceived are animal-relative opportunities for action, or affordances.
“The third element thus is that the aspects of the environment that are perceived are the animal-relative opportunities for action, or "affordances".”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites J.J. Gibson, 1979
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationnone given
The unifying tendency in ecological psychology has obscured many other strands of work in the field.
“On the other hand, we think that the unifying tendency has hidden from view many other interesting strands of work in ecological psychology.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The response to influential mainstream criticism provides the foundation for the unifying program in ecological psychology.
“Indeed, it is the response to this influential criticism (Turvey et al., 1981) that provides the foundation for the unifying program in ecological psychology.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Turvey et al., 1981 source
- Premisecitation
Open systems far from equilibrium that exchange energy and matter can exhibit self-organizing processes in which patterns spontaneously emerge.
“By contrast, open systems, that are far from equilibrium and that do exchange energy and matter, can exhibit self-organizing processes in which patterns spontaneously emerge.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Prigogine, 1980
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Haken, 1987
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Because animals are open systems, they too can exhibit self-organizing processes according to these theories.
“As animals are also open systems, they too can exhibit self-organizing processes according to these theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The variable tau can adaptively guide the gannet's closing of the wings when diving to catch fish.
“Being specific to time-to-contact, this variable, "tau", can adaptively guide the gannet's closing of the wings when diving into the water to catch a fish (Lee & Reddish 1981).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lee & Reddish 1981 source
- Premisecitation
Proponents of the ecological approach have argued for pluralism within cognitive science in order to make room for ecological psychology.
“Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Animal and environment conceptually form an inseparable pair, each implying the other.
“On this view animal and environment conceptually form an inseparable pair.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites J.J. Gibson, 1979
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
The physical laws governing self-organizing processes are independent of the structure of the subsystems involved.
“Importantly, the physical laws that govern such self-organizing processes are structure-independent”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Haken, 1987
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a principled, unified package deal on perception and action.
“Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a "package deal"-a principled and unified perspective on perception and action.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Michaels & Palatinus, 2014 source
- Premisecitation
On the physical approach, ambient structure (a medium) is required to bring affordance and effectivity into informational contact and to actualize them.
“Instead, on the physical approach, there needs to be ambient structure (i.e. a medium) available that brings affordance and effectivity in informational contact and to bring them to actualization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Turvey, 1992 source
- Premisecitation
Affordances and effectivities are duals that imply each other.
“Importantly, affordances and effectivities are duals, they imply each other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Turvey, 1992 source
- Premisecitation
Affordances exist as dispositions in the environment that are complemented by dispositions of the animal.
“Indeed, affordances exist as dispositions in the environment that are complemented with dispositions of the animal.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Turvey, 1992 source
- cites Turvey & Shaw, 1978
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Three different approaches within ecological psychology each have their own style of explanation, ontology, and concepts of information and affordance.
“So far, we have sketched the outlines of three different approaches within ecological psychology, each with their own style of explanation, ontology and concepts of information and affordance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
For affordances to exert selection pressure on action systems across evolutionary, developmental and behavioral timescales, they must be relatively persistent features of the environment.
“In order to put selection pressure on action systems (over evolutionary, developmental, and behavioral timescales), affordances need to be relatively persistent features of the environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Information facilitates the use of affordances.
“Information in short facilitates the use of affordances.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning
Reed's selectionist framework derives from Darwinian evolutionary biology, accounting for animal traits via variation and selection.
“We have seen that Reed's selectionism is firmly rooted in Darwin's evolutionary biology, which explains the properties of animals in terms of variation and selection.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Two laws guarantee a one-to-one-to-one relation between environment, information, and the animal's perception and action.
“Hence, these two laws guarantee a one-to-one-to-one relation between environment, information, and the animal's perception and action (e.g., Burton & Turvey, 1990;Turvey & Carello, 1995).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Edelman forwarded a theory that applies population thinking to the working and development of the brain.
“In a nutshell, Edelman (1987) forwarded a theory that applies the principles of population thinking to the working and development of the brain.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Edelman, 1987
- Premisecitation
Darwin's experiments showed that under favorable conditions worms that had been selective ceased to be selective and pulled leaves in more or less at random.
“Under these favorable conditions, worms that had previously shown selectivity in choice of leaves and the point at which they grasped leaves ceased to show such selectivity and began to perform more or less at random, pulling leaves in from a variety of points.(Reed, 1996, p. 22)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Recognizing the differences between the strands does not preclude productive syntheses within ecological psychology.
“Recognizing the differences between the different strands, does not preclude productive syntheses within the field.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
In rejecting ecological psychology, enactivists have mainly focused on proponents of the physical approach.
“For example, in rejecting ecological psychology, enactivists have mainly focused themselves on proponents of the physical approach (cf.Paolo et al., 2017;Varela et al., 1991).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Paolo et al., 2017 source
- cites Varela et al., 1991
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Some prominent advocates have presented ecological psychology as a package deal comprising the concepts one ought to employ, the explanatory scheme one ought to adhere to, and the philosophical views one ought to hold.
“Some prominent advocates have presented ecological psychology as a “package deal” comprising of the concepts one ought to employ, the explanatory scheme to which one ought to adhere and the philosophical views one ought to hold (Michaels & Palatinus, 2014;Richardson et al., 2008;Turvey, 1990aTurvey, , 1990b)).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
There is a strong and varied research tradition of bringing the physical approach into contact with the social approach.
“There is a strong and varied research tradition of bringing the physical approach into contact with the social approach (Dent, 1990;Hodges & Baron, 1992;Raczaszek-Leonardi, 2009;Schmidt, 2007;Szokolszky & Read, 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Edward Reed was already sketching his biological approach at the time he co-authored the response to Fodor and Pylyshyn that served as the foundation of the physical approach.
“Interestingly, although Edward Reed was at that time already sketching the outlines of his biological approach (see e.g.,Reed & Jones, 1977), he co-authored the response to Fodor and Pylyshyn's criticisms(Turvey et al., 1981) that served as the foundation of the physical approach.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Some highly relevant work in ecological psychology has been done at the interface of the different strands.
“Some highly relevant work in ecological psychology has in fact been done at the interface of the different strands.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Recent work has attempted to integrate the social and the biological approaches.
“In recent work, attempts have been made to integrate the social and the biological (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014;Rietveld et al., 2018;Withagen, 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
Contemporary works in ecological psychology are more pluriform than one might think.
“These, and other contemporary works in ecological psychology are much pluriform than one might think.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 53
- May combine two claims. 21
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationEcological psychology aims to explain how a perceiver learns to differentiate the information specifying what the animal can do.
“ecological psychology aims to explain how a perceiver learns to differentiate the information that specifies what the animals can do (J.J. Gibson & Gibson, 1955).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites J.J. Gibson & Gibson, 1955 source
The Conclusion (p. 9) describes perceptual learning as becoming more sensitive to differences in the stimulus array, supporting the differentiation part of the claim. The paper does not say that the information being differentiated specifies what animals can do; its examples concern identifying objects and discriminating stimuli. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationSelectionist explanations in ecological psychology comprise variation in action systems, encounter with the environment, and selective retention or amplification based on behavioral success.
“Selectionist explanations in ecological psychology consist of three elements: first, there is variation in animal's action systems.”
- Also stated in: § 4.3 Summary · plain
“Second, these animals encounter their environment.And third, a selective retention or amplification based on behavioral success (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2019;Withagen & Chemero, 2009; see also Endler, 1986;Lewontin, 1970).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2019 source
- cites Withagen & Chemero, 2009 source
The available indexed passages contain bibliographic metadata, but no discussion of the proposed three elements. Searches for variation in action systems and for selective retention or amplification found no substantive passage, so the claim cannot be checked against our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Also stated in: § 4.3 Summary · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenSocial ecological psychology focuses on how the social permeates perception-action cycles.
“Social ecological psychology, which focusses on how the social permeates perceptionaction cycles.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenThe three strands develop ecological ideas in different directions, use central concepts differently, adopt different explanatory principles, and embody different philosophical worldviews.
“Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, adopting different explanatory principles, and embodying different philosophical worldviews.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenPhysical ecological psychology focuses on discovering laws governing perception-action, in a manner similar to physics.
“Physical ecological psychology, which focusses on discovering laws that govern perception-action, similar to physics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenEleanor Gibson's work is conceptually strongly intertwined with biological and social ecological psychology.
“Conceptually, Eleanor Gibson's work is strongly intertwined with biological ecological psychology and social ecological psychology.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone givenThe three core elements of the ecological approach appear in each of the different strands, though in quite different ways.
“As we will see throughout this paper, these elements are part of each of the different strands, albeit in quite different ways.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingreasoningThe three lines of thought draw inspiration from different scientific disciplines.
“The three lines of thought each take inspiration in different scientific disciplines.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenEcological psychology is neither a single package deal nor a complete hodgepodge.
“Ecological psychology is not one "package deal", but it is not a complete hodgepodge either.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenBiological ecological psychology focuses on applying evolutionary (selectionist) principles to perception-action cycles.
“Biological ecological psychology: which focusses on applying evolutionary (selectionist) principles to perception-action cycles.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone givenThe three identified lines of thought can justifiably trace their approach back to James Gibson's work.
“As far as we are concerned, the three lines of thought we identified can justifiably trace their approach to James Gibson's work.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingcitationAt other points Reed defined affordances relative to a population of animals.
“At other points, however, he defined affordances "relative to a population of animals" (p.40).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenThe physical approach looks to physics for its style of explanation, seeking general laws that together with circumstances predict particular phenomena, including animal behavior.
“The physical approach looks to physics for its style of explanation.It seeks out general laws that together with circumstances (auxiliary, boundary, and initial conditions) can be used to predict particular phenomena, including animal behavior.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
FindingreasoningSpecification became an indispensable condition for direct perception on the physical approach.
“Such specification thus became a sine qua non for direct perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenThe physical approach adopts a materialist but non-reductive ontology, with physical principles of pattern formation applying at each of nature's scales.
“It adopts a materialist ontology, but one that is non-reductive-the physical principles of pattern formation simply apply at each of nature's scales.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningIn all of Reed's construals, affordances are resources that exist independently of any specific animal and do not depend on being used or perceived.
“Yet in any of his construals, affordances are resources that exist independently of any specific animal and do not depend on being used and perceived.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
FindingcitationProponents of the physical approach held that self-organization theory provides a new and better understanding of the evolutionary process.
“proponents of the physical approach asserted that this theory of self-organization can also provide a new, and in their view, better understanding of the evolutionary process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Swenson & Turvey, 1991 source
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe three strands share some basic ingredients but diverge substantially in how they conceive of the research program of ecological psychology.
“Although they share some basic ingredients, the approaches diverge wildly in how they conceive of the research program of ecological psychology.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
FindingreasoningThe paper's approach provides a more comparative conceptual analysis of the different strands in post-Gibsonian ecological psychology than Heft's survey.
“Our approach provides a more comparative conceptual analysis of the different strands in post-Gibsonian ecological psychology.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenThe concept of affordances has become widespread across psychological science.
“The concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenThe two decades following Gibson's death in 1979 are formative years for ecological psychology as it is understood today.
“We have chosen this period, because we take these to be formative years for ecological psychology as we see it today.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenAgent-environment inseparability, direct perception and affordances are the three core elements of the ecological approach.
“These three core elements of the ecological approach, namely agent-environment inseparability, direct perception and affordances are something of a wish list for a full-fledged ecological psychology.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationEcological psychology focuses on the environment in which an animal lives.
“ecological psychology focuses on the environment in which an animal lives.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mace, 1977
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationEcological psychology acquired a bad reputation, which contributes to reluctance to engage it.
“One reason for this is that ecological psychology developed a bad reputation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Dennett 2017
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenContemporary ecological psychology has appeared inaccessible to outsiders and defensive of its legacy.
“Yet contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe guiding principle of the physical approach was that foundational physical principles govern pattern formation in open systems in both the inanimate and the animate world.
“The guiding principle was that there must be a set of foundational (physical) principles that govern pattern formation in open systems in both the inanimate and the animate world.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Turvey, 1990a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationProponents of the physical approach assumed that nature applies a single set of strategies with equanimity to each of her scales.
“Indeed, proponents of the physical approach assumed that "there is a single set of strategies that nature applies, with equanimity to each of her scales" (Turvey, 1990a, p. 63, emphasis omitted).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Turvey, 1990a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationCostall holds a relational conception of information: information is not an intrinsic property of light, sound, or other energy, but a functional concept realized in relation to a particular animal and purpose.
“Costall points out that "information": is not an intrinsic property of structures of light, sound, and other forms of energy.'Information' is a functional concept-information in relation to a particular animal, in relation to particular purpose, and 'realized' within that relation (Costall, 2003, p. 82)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Costall, 2003
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationIn Reed's view, selectionism is the natural ally of ecological psychology.
“Indeed, selectionism is in Reed's (1996) view the "natural ally" (p.187) of ecological psychology.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationOn the physical view, the evolution of perception-action cycles is a necessary result of thermodynamic principles.
“Indeed, on this view, the evolution of perception-action cycles is the necessary result of thermodynamic principles.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Swenson & Turvey, 1991 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPerception is shaped by sociohistorical processes, but this mediation does not make perception indirect in the sense of requiring mental representations or unconscious inferences.
“Perception is shaped by such sociohistorical processes.But this kind of "mediation", as Costall calls it above, does not entail that perception becomes indirect, in the sense of requiring mental representations or unconscious inferences (Costall 1989(Costall , 1995)).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationFrom this ecological point of view, the nervous system is not a stimulus-response mechanism, and neurons do not act as commanders of the body or embody representations of the environment.
“From this ecological point of view, the nervous system is not a stimulus-response mechanism, neurons do not act as commanders of the body or embody representations of the environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationReed asserted that Darwinian variation and selection can further ecological psychology and that Gibsonian concepts of affordances and information can help understand the evolution of animals.
“Reed asserted that the Darwinian theory of variation and selection can further ecological psychology, and that the Gibsonian concepts of affordances and information can help to understand the evolution of animals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe physical approach holds that ambient energy distributions are necessarily specific to the facts of the environment and of an animal's movements relative to it.
“The physical approach: holds that ambient energy distributions are necessarily specific to the facts of the environment and of an animal's movements relative to the environment […].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Turvey & Shaw 1999
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationOn more ambitious physical proposals, the availability of specific affordances depends on circumstances, while their bare possibility is given with the laws of nature.
“On more ambitious proposals, the availability of specific affordances depends on specific circumstances (i.e. initial conditions etc.), but their "bare possibility" is given with the laws of nature (Shaw, 2001;Turvey, 1992, see also Shaw et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationCarello and Turvey stressed that the specification principle is an engine of discovery rather than a testable and falsifiable hypothesis.
“Indeed, Carello and Turvey (2004) stressed that rather than a hypothesis that can be tested and falsified, the specification principle is "an engine of discovery" (p.27) for finding the lawful relations that govern perception and action.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Carello & Turvey, 2004 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningA lack of specificity between ambient structure and its environmental source would undermine ecological psychology's claim to direct perception.
“On this approach then, a lack of specificity, understood as a lawful relation holding between ambient structure and its environmental source, would jeopardize ecological psychology's claim to direct perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenFor Reed, only affordances exert selection pressures on an animal's behavior.
“For Reed, affordances (and only affordances) exert selection pressures on the behavior of an animal.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationReed asserted that selectionist processes operate at all timescales, including behavior, development and evolution.
“Moreover, he asserted that selectionist processes are at work at all timescales, not only at the scale of behavior but also at the scale of development and evolution.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe law of maximum entropy production entails that order produces entropy at a faster rate than disorder.
“This law entails that "order produces entropy at a faster rate than disorder" (Swenson & Turvey, 1991, p. 317).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Swenson & Turvey, 1991 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationReed's starting point was to show that the psychological is part of nature and can therefore be studied ecologically.
“The starting point for Reed is "to show that 'the psychological' is part of nature and can therefore be studied ecologically" (Reed, 1996, p. 8).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSocial phenomena are not merely another topic grafted onto basic non-social perception and action; the social permeates and transforms human living.
“In other words, social phenomena are not just another topic that could be grafted onto a basic, non-social form of perception and action, rather the social permeates and transforms the human way of living.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe physical approach aims to discover laws governing perception and action; the biological approach aims to explain adaptive regulation of interactions with the environment; the social approach aims to explain how human life becomes permeated by normative and sociocultural concerns.
“The physical approach aims to discover the laws that govern perception and action, the biological approach aims to explain how animals adaptively regulate their interactions with the environment, and the social approach aims to explain how human life becomes permeated by normative and sociocultural concerns.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSocial ecological psychology aims to bring social dimensions to the fore, socializing affordances and stressing the social constitution of ecological psychology.
“They aimed at "socializing affordances" (Costall, 1995) and stressed the "social constitution of ecological psychology" (Heft, 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationReed introduces the concept of regulation: animals regulate their encounters with environmental affordances on the basis of ecological information available in ambient arrays.
“To that end, Reed introduces the concept of regulation-animals regulate their encounters with the affordances of their environments on the basis of the rich ecological information that is available in the ambient arrays.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationFor Reed, the worm experiments proved that simple organisms are not mere automata but adaptively regulate their encounters with their environment.
“For Reed (as for Darwin), this proved that simple organisms are not "mere automata" but adaptively regulate their encounters with their environment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAccording to Reed, neural Darwinism must be combined with an ecological account of environmental structures and can thereby explain perception and action.
“According to Reed, this dynamic process of neural Darwinism needs to be combined with an ecological account of the environmental structures involved in the selection process, and can provide an explanation of perception and action.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationReed proposed that the selectionist perspective finds a natural alliance with Edelman's neural Darwinism.
“Reed proposed that the selectionist perspective on perception and actions finds a natural alliance with Edelman's neural Darwinism (Reed, 1989).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1989 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationIn Reed's selectionist approach, affordances are environmental constraints that create selection pressure on the behavior of individual organisms.
“Fundamentally, in Reed's selectionist approach, affordances are these environmental constraints: "affordances and only the relative availability (or nonavailability) of affordances create selection pressure on the behavior of individual organisms; hence, behavior is regulated with respect to the affordances of the environment for a given animal" (Reed, 1996, p. 18, italics in original).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reed, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationTurvey equated affordances with lawfulness, holding that real possibility is identical to lawfulness.
“Real possibility is identical to lawfulness (Turvey, 1992, p. 177)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Turvey, 1992 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenAfter writing that response, Reed and Turvey went their separate ways.
“After the writing of this response, Reed and Turvey clearly went their separate ways (see sections 4 and 6.2).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningTaking note of each position's aims, sensitivities, merits, and limits will facilitate collaboration and crosspollination.
“On the contrary, taking note of the aims and sensitivities of each position, their merits and limits, we believe it will facilitate collaboration and crosspollination.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe unifying tendency in ecological psychology has deterred otherwise interested thinkers and obscured the rich and pluriform ways the ecological approach has developed.
“This unifying tendency has deterred “otherwise interested thinkers” (Dennett, 2017) and hid from view the rich and pluriform ways in which the ecological approach has developed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Dennett, 2017
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe explanatory and philosophical background of the most vocal proponents has not helped redress the selective neglect of Eleanor Gibson's work.
“The explanatory and philosophical background of the most vocal of these (see Section 3) has not been helpful in redressing this selective emphasis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningContemporary works in ecological psychology propose bridges between strands and also connect to a multitude of neighboring fields and theories.
“They propose bridges between strands of ecological psychology, but also connect to a multitude of neighboring fields and theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationHeft's (2023) analysis of post-Gibsonian thought is more historical and sociological, highlighting the labs, research groups, conferences, and personal connections that formed it.
“Heft's analysis is more historical and sociological and highlights the different labs, research groups, conferences and personal connections that together formed post-Gibsonian thought.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Heft, 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone givenEach of the three identified lines of thought can justifiably trace its approach to James Gibson's work.
“As far as we are concerned, the three lines of thought we identified can justifiably trace their approach to James Gibson's work.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningOpening ecological psychology to thinkers interested in embodied and embedded cognition may infuse the different approaches with new empirical methods and ideas that spark further development of the field.
“Opening ecological psychology up to thinkers otherwise interested in embodied and embedded cognition may come to infuse the different approaches with fitting new empirical methods and ideas that spark further development of the field as a whole.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationAcknowledging the different positions on concepts, explanations, and ontologies will force the views into greater articulation and foster a productive pluralism in the coming years.
“Acknowledging the different positions on the concepts employed, the explanations sought, and the ontologies committed to, we believe, will force one another's view “into greater articulation” (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 21) and foster a productive pluralism for the years to come.6”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Feyerabend, 1975
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningEcological psychology never was, and should not be, a monolithic research program.
“We hope to have shown that ecological psychology never was, nor should be, a monolithic research program.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The three identified strands are distinct and internally coherent lines of thought.
“We identify three major lines of thought (see also Heft, 2023;Withagen, 2022).”
The paper relies on this without support.
The differences among the three strands are substantial enough that unification is undesirable for ecological psychology.
“we think that ecological psychology is better off aiming for productive pluralism than for unification.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The three strands identified (physical, biological, and social ecological psychology) are the major lines of thought in post-Gibsonian ecological psychology.
“Our analysis of the formative years of ecological psychology identified three major strands of thought: physical ecological psychology, biological ecological psychology and social ecological psychology.”
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Self-organization, flow fields, and information
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The Challenge of a Physical Account of Action: A Personal View*
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(2018) · Cited by 54 · see citing works
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Accommodating unobservability to control flight attitude with optic flow
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What’s Inside Your Head Once You’ve Figured Out What Your Head’s Inside Of
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Self-citationRadical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience
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Chapter 2 Applying the Theory of Action Systems to the Study of Motor Skills
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A Ten Commandments for Ecological Psychology
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On Ecological Conceptualizations of Perceptual Systems and Action Systems
Withagen, R., & Michaels, C. F. (2005) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959354305057265 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Pickup of Nonspecifying Variables Does Not Entail Indirect Perception
Withagen, R. (2004) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1207/s15326969eco1603_4 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
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Turvey, M. T. (2009) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1080/10407410902877041 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Attentional actions – an ecological-enactive account of utterances of concrete words
van den Herik, J. C. (2018) · Psychology of Language and Communication · doi:10.2478/plc-2018-0005 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
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Darwin's earthworms: A case study in evolutionary psychology
Reed, E. S. (1982) · Behaviorism · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Editorial: Enaction and Ecological Psychology: Convergences and Complementarities
McGann, M., Paolo, E. A. D., Heras-Escribano, M., & Chemero, A. P. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.617898 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Towards a definition of living systems: A theory of ecological support for behavior
Reed, E. S., & Jones, R. K. (1977) · Acta Biotheoretica · doi:10.1007/bf00048424 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Psychology in an Indeterminate World
van Dijk, L. (2021) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620958005 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Self-citationAffective Gibsonian Psychology
Withagen, R. (2022) · doi:10.4324/9781003213031 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Self-citationSzokolszky, Á., & Read, C. (2018) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1080/10407413.2018.1410409 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Neural Regulation of Adaptive Behavior
Reed, E. S. (1989) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1207/s15326969eco0101_5 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Affordance Types and Affordance Tokens: Are Gibson’s Affordances Trustworthy?
Shaw, R. E., Kinsella-Shaw, J. M., & Mace, W. M. (2018) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1080/10407413.2018.1508353 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Costall, A. (2004) · Theories of Infant Development · doi:10.1002/9780470752180.ch3 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Costall, A. (1999) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959354399093011 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
The Fallacy of Partitioning: Epigenetics' Validation of the Organism-Environment System
Lickliter, R. E. (2009) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1080/10407410902877157 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
What Should A “Gibsonian Neuroscience” Look Like? Introduction to the Special Issue
de Wit, M. M., & Withagen, R. (2019) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1080/10407413.2019.1615203 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Self-citationEnaction and Ecological Psychology: Convergences and Complementarities
(2021) · Frontiers research topics · doi:10.3389/978-2-88966-431-3 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Intentions in Ecological Psychology: An Anscombean Proposal
Segundo‐Ortin, M., & Kalis, A. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00661-x · Cited by 14 · see citing works
(2009) · Pragmatics & Cognition · doi:10.1075/pc.17.3 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Affordances, Dynamic Experience, and the Challenge of Reification
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Algoristic Foundations to Cognitive Psychology 1
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Ecological Psychology as a Theory of Social Cognition
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Heft, H. (2022) · Intellectual Journeys in Ecological Psychology · doi:10.4324/9781003160724-1
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Stoffregen, T., & Wagman, J. (2024) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/s13423-024-02535-y · Cited by 25 · see citing works
“…species, across development, and across niches (Blau & Wagman, 2022; Gibson 1966; Stoffregen & Bardy, 2001; Stoffregen et al., 2017; Turvey, 2018), and it must also apply across what some scholars have referred to as the physical, biological, and social domains (e.g., Bruineberg et al., 2023).”
The Visual Information Available in Virtual Reality
Baggs, E., Grabarczyk, P., & Rucińska, Z. (2024) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1080/10407413.2024.2322992 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
The Experience of Affordances in an Intersubjective World
Kiverstein, J., & Artese, G. (2023) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-023-09969-4 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“…terms that cut across dualities of knower and known, subject and object, or animal and environment (Heft 1989, 2001, 2003; Costall 1995, 2004 ; Stoffregen 2003; Chemero 2003, 2009; Riet-veld and Kiverstein 2014; Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Van Dijk and Rietveld 2017; Bruineberg et al. 2023).”
Disabling Scaffolds: The Lived Embodiment of Disability in an Oppressive Sociomaterial Environment
Toro, J., Rietveld, E., & Kiverstein, J. (2025) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-024-10132-w · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“For an excellent summary of the debate and what is at stake, see Bruineberg et al. (2024). provides rich descriptions of how our minds are also vulnerable to being invaded by affective regimes.”
Reaching conceptual stability by re-articulating empirical and theoretical work on affordances
Malo, R., & Prié, Y. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1283168 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
A Differentiated Field of Affordances: Redefining Perceptual Skill in Physical Education Teachers
McDonic, L., van der Kamp, J., & van Maarseveen, M. J. J. (2024) · Ecological psychology · doi:10.1080/10407413.2024.2432645 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“This view aligns more with the ‘social’ strand of ecological psychology than the ‘physical’ or ‘biological’ strands (Bruineberg et al., 2024).”
Tong, P., An, I. S., & Xu, S. Z. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1793016 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
On the significance of biogenic approach in comparative cognition
Matsui, H., & Hata, Y. (2025) · New Ideas in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2025.101186 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The affordance hypothesisPreprint
Baggs, E., & Raja, V. (2024) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/xu4wk · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The Gibsonian movement and Koffka’s Principles of Gestalt Psychology
Withagen, R. (2024) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/09593543241280056 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Although he centralized affordances in his later work, arguing that we perceive the environment primarily in terms of action possibilities, he acknowledged the fact that we can also perceive objects, events, surfaces, and pictures as such (see Withagen, 2023).”
Self-citationPerceiving the affordance of interceptability for another
Damle, S., Bootsma, R. J., & Zaal, F. T. J. M. (2025) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1566278 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Individualization Without Internalization
van Dijk, L. (2025) · Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1111/cogs.70132 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Self-citationLemoyne, J., Bespomoshchnov, V. A., & Saarinen, M. (2025) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1583349
Searching for rightness: Ecological perspectives on realizing values in acting and perceiving
Hodges, B. H. (2025) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/09593543251366272 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Bruineberg et al. (2024) argue that there have been at least three different strands of ecological theory and research that have their roots in Gibson’s (1966, 1979) work: the physical, the biological, and the social.”
Introduction: Progress in Radical Embodiment
Baggs, E., Segundo‐Ortin, M., de Oliveira, G. S., & Raja, V. (2026) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-026-10412-7
“Indeed, it does not even capture all contemporary work in ecological psychology, much of which does not use dynamical systems methods (Bruineberg et al. 2024).”
Ward, D. (2026) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/10597123261450094
“I won’t attempt the forensic analysis required to pin down the commitments of individual ecological psychologists on this issue (Bruineberg et al., 2024 is a helpful start).”
Bjørndal, C. T., & O’Sullivan, M. (2026) · Frontiers in Sports and Active Living · doi:10.3389/fspor.2026.1869713
“More directly, they are constituted within the sociocultural practices of the game, the tactical traditions, positional conventions, and rule structures that collectively shape what players come to perceive as opportunities to act (37, 38).”
Mendoza-García, A., Alessandroni, N., & Moreno-Núñez, A. (2026) · Infant and Child Development · doi:10.1002/icd.70140
Canonical affordances and the multitemporal depth of sociomateriality
Artese, G. F., & Prezioso, E. (2026) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-026-10216-5
- Authors
- Bruineberg, J., Withagen, R., & van Dijk, L.
- Affiliations
- Macquarie University (AU)
- University Medical Center Groningen (NL)
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2024-07
- Volume
- 131
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 993-1006
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W4384819783
- Semantic Scholar
- 51fb9b044d222d183bb7f3c3a1e5f79c2e996f9b
- Cited by
- 20
- References
- 101
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 1
- FWCI
- 2.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Socio-Environmental Systems Modeling (submittedVersion)
- University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- TU/e Research Portal (submittedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Macquarie University
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- ecological psychology, affordances, embodied cognition, situated cognition, perception and action, Gibson, philosophy of psychology
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Ecology, Environment, Humans, Psychology
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