Seeking Confirmation Is Rational for Deterministic Hypotheses
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The tendency to test outcomes that are predicted by our current theory (the confirmation bias) is one of the best‐known biases of human decision making. We prove that the confirmation bias is an optimal strategy for testing hypotheses when those hypotheses are deterministic, each making a single prediction about the next event in a sequence. Our proof applies for two normative standards commonly used for evaluating hypothesis testing: maximizing expected information gain and maximizing the probability of falsifying the current hypothesis. This analysis rests on two assumptions: (a) that people predict the next event in a sequence in a way that is consistent with Bayesian inference; and (b) when testing hypotheses, people test the hypothesis to which they assign highest posterior probability. We present four behavioral experiments that support these assumptions, showing that a simple Bayesian model can capture people's predictions about numerical sequences (Experiments 1 and 2), and that we can alter the hypotheses that people choose to test by manipulating the prior probability of those hypotheses (Experiments 3 and 4).
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Citations
Cites
Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211 · Cited by 2,094 · cited 3×
“Using maximizing the probability of falsifying the current working hypothesis as our normative standard (as in Klayman & Ha, 1987), the analysis is straightforward.”
BackgroundMethodWason, P. C. (1968) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/14640746808400161 · Cited by 1,476
Varieties of Confirmation Bias
Klayman, J. (1995) · Psychology of Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/s0079-7421(08)60315-1 · Cited by 755
Cited by
Lieder, F., & Griffiths, T. L. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1900061x · Cited by 892
Self-citationFormalizing Neurath’s ship: approximate algorithms for online causal learning.
Bramley, N. R., Dayan, P., Griffiths, T. L., & Lagnado, D. A. (2017) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000061 · Cited by 136
“…paper 10The number of directed acyclic graphs on N nodes, |M|N , can be computed with the recurrence relation |M|N =∑ k∈N (−1) k−1(N 2 ) 2k(N−k)|M|N−1 (see Robinson, 1977) ple under deterministic or sparse hypotheses spaces or peaked priors (Austerweil & Griffiths, 2011; Navarro & Perfors, 2011).”
Self-citationDorst, K. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3918498 · Cited by 108
Opinion Dynamics with Confirmation Bias
Allahverdyan, A. E., & Galstyan, A. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099557 · Cited by 90
Metadata
- Authors
- Austerweil, J. L., & Griffiths, T. L.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-01-05
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 499-526
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2171439729
- Cited by
- 44
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 1.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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