The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Governance in India
Abstract
The Indian corporate governance system has both supported and held back India's ascent to the top ranks of the world's economies. While on paper the country's legal system provides some of the best investor protection in the world, enforcement is a major problem, with overburdened courts and significant corruption. Ownership remains concentrated and family business groups continue to be the dominant business model, with significant pyramiding and evidence of tunneling activity that transfers cash flow and value from minority to controlling shareholders. But for all its shortcomings, Indian corporate governance has taken major steps toward becoming a system capable of inspiring confidence among institutional and, increasingly, foreign investors. The Securities and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI), which was established as part of the comprehensive economic reforms launched in 1991, has made considerable progress in becoming a rigorous regulatory regime that helps ensure transparency and fair practice. And the National Stock Exchange of India, also established as part of the reforms, now functions with enough efficiency and transparency to be generating the third‐largest number of trades in the world, just behind the NASDAQ and NYSE. Among more recent changes, the enactment of Sarbanes—Oxley type measures in 2004—which includes protections for minority shareholders in family‐ or “promoter”‐led businesses—has contributed to recent increases in institutional and foreign stock ownership. And while family‐ and government‐controlled business groups continue to be the rule, India has also seen the rise of successful companies like Infosys that are free of the influence of a dominant family or group and have made the individual shareholder their central governance focus.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00121-1 · Cited by 5,381
What Works in Securities Laws?
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., & SHLEIFER, A. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00828.x · Cited by 2,785
Executive compensation as an agency problem
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2009) · The Economic Nature of the Firm · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511817410.026 · Cited by 2,282
Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups
Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., & Mullainathan, S. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399463 · Cited by 1,674
Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India
Besley, T., & Burgess, R. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839533 · Cited by 1,394
The World Price of Earnings Opacity
Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., & Welker, M. (2003) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2003.78.3.641 · Cited by 1,201
Partial Privatization and Firm Performance
GUPTA, N. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00753.x · Cited by 691
Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Evidence from India
Sarkar, J., & Sarkar, S. (2000) · International Review of Finance · doi:10.1111/1468-2443.00010 · Cited by 457
Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firm Market Values? Event Study Evidence from India
Black, B. S., & Khanna, V. S. (2007) · Journal of Empirical Legal Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1740-1461.2007.00106.x · Cited by 228
Cited by
Board Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from India's Top Companies
Jackling, B., & Johl, S. (2009) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00760.x · Cited by 930
Metadata
- Authors
- Chakrabarti, R., Megginson, W., & Yadav, P. K.
- Venue
- Journal of Applied Corporate Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-03-31
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 59-72
- ISSN
- 1078-1196 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6622
- OpenAlex
- W2103193301
- Cited by
- 269
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 26.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corporate Governance in India. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2008.00169.x
- The paper
- Chakrabarti, R., Megginson, W., & Yadav, P. K. (2008). Corporate Governance in India. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2008.00169.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.