The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation
Abstract
Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief-desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean and the Kantian instantiation of that model fail to account for the internal (conceptual) connection between normative and motivating reasons required by internalism. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief-desire model, I argue that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotions are affective perceptions. They have motivational force so that they can contribute to the explanation of action. At the same time they can rationalise actions because they have an intentional content which resembles the content of sensory perception in being representational. Because of this, the emotions can noninferentially justify judgements, which in turn can justify actions. I conclude by outlining the Aristotelian account of practical reason and ethics that emerges from integrating the emotions into practical reasoning. Doing the right thing is much more a matter of seeing things right than of drawing the right inferences. Seeing things right, in its turn, is not only to justify an action: il necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly.
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Cites
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Cited by
Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception
Vetter, P., & Newen, A. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.007 · Cited by 263
Grief and the Unity of Emotion
Ratcliffe, M. (2017) · Midwest Studies In Philosophy · doi:10.1111/misp.12071 · Cited by 63
Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account
Fernandez Velasco, P., & Loev, S. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02755-4 · Cited by 43
Metadata
- Authors
- Döring, S. A.
- Venue
- Dialectica
- Publisher
- Verein philosophie.ch
- Published
- 2007
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 363-394
- ISSN
- 0012-2017 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2011387772
- Cited by
- 466
- References
- 58
- FWCI
- 42.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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