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Cited by 312

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications

Chiappori, Pierre-André, Jullien, Bruno, Salanié, Bernard, Salanié, François·2006·The RAND Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00057.x
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Abstract

Several recent articles on empirical contract theory and insurance have tested for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk, as predicted by standard models of pure adverse selection or pure moral hazard. We show here that the positive correlationproperty can be extended to general setups: competitive insurance markets and cases where risk aversion is public. We test our results on a French dataset. Our tests confirm that the estimated correlation is positive; they also suggest the presence of market power.

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Metadata

Authors
Chiappori, P.-A., Jullien, B., Salanié, B., & Salanié, F.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2006-12
Volume
37
Issue
4
Pages
783-798
ISSN
  • 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
  • 1756-2171
DOI
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00057.x
OpenAlex
W2113722078
Cited by
312
References
2
FWCI
50.97
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00057.x
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Chiappori, P.-A., Jullien, B., Salanié, B., & Salanié, F. (2006). Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00057.x

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.