Does affirmative action lead to mismatch? A new test and evidence
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We argue that once we take into account the students' rational enrollment decisions, mismatch in the sense that the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action admission policies are made worse off ex ante can only occur if selective universities possess private information. Ex ante mismatch occurs when revelation of this information would have changed the student's choice of school. This necessary condition for mismatch provides the basis for a new test. The test is implemented using data from the Campus Life and Learning Project at Duke University. Evidence shows that Duke does possess private information that is a statistically significant predictor of students' post-enrollment academic performance. Further, this private information is shown to affect the subjective measures of students' satisfaction as well as their persistence in more difficult majors. We also propose strategies to evaluate more conclusively whether the presence of Duke private information has generated mismatch.
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When schools have private information on the probability of success, minority students can be made worse off under affirmative action.
“when schools have private information on the probability of success, it is possible for minority students to be made worse off under affirmative action.”
From Affirmative action and university fit: evidence from Proposition 209 (2014) · cites this paper as Arcidiacono, Aucejo, Fang, and Spenner (2011)
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Cited by
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Affirmative action and university fit: evidence from Proposition 209
Arcidiacono, P., Aucejo, E., Coate, P., & Hotz, V. J. (2014) · IZA Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1186/2193-8997-3-7 · Cited by 70 · see citing works
Self-citation
- Authors
- Arcidiacono, P., Aucejo, E. M., Fang, H., & Spenner, K. I.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Duke University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Arcidiacono, Peter
- Venue
- Quantitative Economics
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2011-11
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 303-333
- ISSN
- 1759-7323 (ISSN-L)
- DOI
- 10.3982/qe83
- OpenAlex
- W2323313545
- Cited by
- 80
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 13.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Quantitative Economics (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Education › Higher Education Research Studies
- Social Sciences › Education › School Choice and Performance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- affirmative action, university admission, mismatch, private information, selective colleges, student enrollment decisions, academic performance, student satisfaction, academic persistence, Duke University
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