The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A search cost model of obfuscation
Open accessAbstract
This article develops models in which obfuscation is individually rational for oligopolistic firms. Firms sell a homogeneous good to rational consumers who incur search costs to learn prices. Search costs are endogenized by allowing obfuscation—firms have an unobservable action that increases the time needed to learn their price. One model involves search costs convex in shopping time. We show that slight convexity can dramatically alter the equilibrium price distribution. A second model examines an informational linkage between current and future search costs: consumers are uncertain about a component of search costs. Here, a signal‐jamming mechanism can lead to equilibrium obfuscation.
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Cites
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
Grossman, S. J. (1981) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466995 · Cited by 2,483
Diamond, P. A. (1971) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(71)90013-5 · Cited by 1,629
Milgrom, P., & Shannon, C. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951479 · Cited by 1,563
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
Gabaix, X., & Laibson, D. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.505 · Cited by 1,426
Burdett, K., & Judd, K. L. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912045 · Cited by 1,280
Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
Weitzman, M. L. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1910412 · Cited by 1,074
Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion
Salop, S., & Stiglitz, J. (1977) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296903 · Cited by 1,032
Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices
Butters, G. R. (1977) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296902 · Cited by 1,032
Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search
Stahl, D. O. (1989) · American Economic Review · Cited by 715
Cited by
Match Quality, Search, and the Internet Market for Used Books
Ellison, G., & Ellison, S. F. (2018) · doi:10.3386/w24197 · Cited by 53
Self-citationFive Facts about MPCs: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment
Boehm, J., Fize, E., & Jaravel, X. (2025) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20240138 · Cited by 30
Metadata
- Authors
- Ellison, G., & Wolitzky, A.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-09
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 417-441
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-2171
- OpenAlex
- W3024479170
- Cited by
- 255
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 37.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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