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Cited by 53Digital Platforms and EconomicsConsumer Market Behavior and PricingMerger and Competition Analysis

Match Quality, Search, and the Internet Market for Used Books

Open access
Ellison, Glenn, Ellison, Sara Fisher·2018·National Bureau of Economic Research
DOI 10.3386/w24197
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Abstract

This paper examines the effect of the Internet on markets in which match-quality is important, including an analysis of the market for used books.A model in which sellers of unusual objects wait for high-value buyers to arrive brings out match quality and competition effects through which improved search technologies may increase both price dispersion and social welfare.A reduced-form empirical analysis finds support for a number of more nuanced predictions of the model in the context of the used book market, exploiting both cross-sectional differences across books and time-series differences in the wake of Amazon's acquisition and incorporation of a large used book marketplace.The paper develops a framework for structural estimation of a model based on the theory.The estimates suggest that the shift to Internet sales substantially increased both seller profits and consumer surplus.

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  • When products are differentiated, lower search costs can paradoxically lead to higher prices and greater dispersion.

    “When products are differentiated, for example, lower search costs can paradoxically lead to higher prices and greater dispersion (Ellison and Ellison 2018;Kaye 2024).”

    From The Coasean Singularity? Demand, Supply, and Market Design with AI Agents (2025) · cites this paper as Ellison and Ellison 2018

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Research works printed but not linked: 32

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Ellison, G., & Ellison, S. F.
Affiliations
National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
ORCID
Ellison, Glenn
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Publisher
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
2018-01
DOI
10.3386/w24197
OpenAlex
W2784009180
Cited by
53
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 1
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
Locations
National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
Keywords
match quality, search, used books, internet market, price dispersion, social welfare (welfare economics), search technology, Amazon, online marketplaces, seller profit, consumer surplus, structural estimation

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