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Telling as Inviting to Trust
Abstract
How can I give you a reason to believe what I tell you? I can influence the evidence available to you. Or I can simply invite your trust. These two ways of giving reasons work very differently. When a speaker tells her hearer that p, I argue, she intends that he gain access to a prima facie reason to believe that p that derives not from evidence but from his mere understanding of her act. Unlike mere assertions, acts of telling give reasons directly. They give reasons by inviting the hearer's trust. This yields a novel form of anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. The status of testimony as a sui generis source of epistemic warrant is entailed by the nature of the act of telling. We can discover the nature of this illocution, and its epistemic role, by examining how it functions in the real world of human relations.
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Citations
Cited by
Lackey, J. (2008) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.001.0001 · Cited by 688
Trust, Distrust and Commitment
Hawley, K. (2014) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12000 · Cited by 535
FRICKER, E. (2006) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00550.x · Cited by 253
Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal
Dormandy, K. (2024) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2020.49 · Cited by 42
Metadata
- Authors
- HINCHMAN, E. S.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-05
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 562-587
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W1988162812
- Cited by
- 387
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 15.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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