The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
Abstract
We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a principled argument for KA, based on the inference rule KB: if a subject knows that A is the best thing she can do, she is rational to do A. In the second half of the paper, we consider and reject the two most promising objections to our case for KA, one based on the Gricean notion of conversational implicature and the other based on a contextualist maneuver.
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Cites
Levinson, S. C. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813313 · Cited by 5,137
Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature
Levinson, S. C. (2000) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5526.001.0001 · Cited by 2,404
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Stanley, J. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199288038.001.0001 · Cited by 1,653
Lewis, D. (1996) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048409612347521 · Cited by 1,450
The Logic of Conventional Implicatures
Potts, C. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273829.001.0001 · Cited by 1,311
Smith, D. (2005) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.x · Cited by 1,281
Nozick, R. (1993) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400820832 · Cited by 1,010
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2002) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-111-1-67 · Cited by 786
Self-citationAssertion, Knowledge, and Context
DeRose, K. (2002) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-111-2-167 · Cited by 742
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons
Cohen, S. (1999) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.3 · Cited by 737
Metadata
- Authors
- FANTL, J., & MCGRATH, M.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-10-18
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 558-589
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2140958637
- Cited by
- 330
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 48.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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