How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief‐forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach’s work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief‐forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought, and address objections to it. We conclude by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological debates.
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Cites
Burge, T. (1993) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185680 · Cited by 929
Cited by
Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action
Enoch, D. (2006) · Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-115-2-169 · Cited by 521
Self-citationConceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
(2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801856.001.0001 · Cited by 482
Enoch, D. (2010) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzq070 · Cited by 192
“74 For more on — and against — this requirement, see Enoch and Schechter 2008.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- ENOCH, D., & SCHECHTER, J.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-05
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 547-579
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2029504242
- Cited by
- 160
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 13.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- ENOCH, D., & SCHECHTER, J. (2008). How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00157.x
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