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MATCHING BIAS IN THE SELECTION TASK
Abstract
A previous study (Evans, 1972) found that subjects tend to match rather than alter named values when constructing verifying and falsifying cases of conditional rules. It was suggested that this tendency (‘matching bias’) might account for the responses normally observed in Wason's (1968, 1969) ‘selection task’. This suggestion was tested by giving subjects the selection task with conditional rules in which the presence and absence of negative components was systematically varied, to see whether subjects consistently attempted to verify the rules (Wason's theory) or whether they continued to choose the matching values despite the presence of negatives, which would reverse the logical meaning of such selections. Significant matching tendencies were observed on four independent measures, and the overall pattern, with matching bias cancelled out, gave no evidence for a verification bias, indicating instead that the logically correct values were most frequently chosen.
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Cited by
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Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Metadata
- Authors
- EVANS, J. S. B. T., & LYNCH, J. S.
- Venue
- British Journal of Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1973-08
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 391-397
- ISSN
- 0007-1269 (ISSN-L)
- 2044-8295
- OpenAlex
- W2161527432
- Cited by
- 305
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- EVANS, J. S. B. T., & LYNCH, J. S. (1973). MATCHING BIAS IN THE SELECTION TASK. British Journal of Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8295.1973.tb01365.x
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