CoChat

Against the theory of ‘Theory of Mind’

Hobson, R. Peter · 1991 · British Journal of Developmental Psychology
Cited by 250

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to argue against the view that young children develop a ‘theory’ that people have minds, and to suggest reasons why children's concepts of the mind and of mental states are not adequately characterized as ‘theoretical’ in nature. I propose that what children acquire is knowledge of persons with minds, and that they do so through experience of interpersonal relations. I emphasize that infants' capacity for personal relatedness, the psychological bedrock for their understanding of persons, is partly constituted by innately determined perceptual‐affective sensibilities towards the bodily appearances and behaviour of others. It is likely that children come to make inferences in the course of enriching and systematizing their concepts of mind, but this does not justify the view that ‘mental states’ are hypothetical constructs.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.2044-835x.1991.tb00860.x

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 250

Metadata

Authors
Hobson, R. P.
Venue
British Journal of Developmental Psychology
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1991-03
Volume
9
Issue
1
Pages
33-51
ISSN
  • 0261-510X (ISSN-L)
  • 2044-835X
OpenAlex
W2120573958
Cited by
250
References
0
FWCI
42.37
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Against the theory of ‘Theory of Mind’. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.2044-835x.1991.tb00860.x
The paper
Hobson, R. P. (1991). Against the theory of ‘Theory of Mind’. British Journal of Developmental Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835x.1991.tb00860.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.