The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality
Abstract
As adults we believe that our knowledge of our own psychological states is substantially different from our knowledge of the psychological states of others: First-person knowledge comes directly from experience, but third-person knowledge involves inference. Developmental evidence suggests otherwise. Many 3-year-old children are consistently wrong in reporting some of their own immediately past psychological states and show similar difficulties reporting the psychological states of others. At about age 4 there is an important developmental shift to a representational model of the mind. This affects children's understanding of their own minds as well as the minds of others. Our sense that our perception of our own minds is direct may be analogous to many cases where expertise provides an illusion of direct perception. These empirical findings have important implications for debates about the foundations of cognitive science.
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Cites
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“These findings are consistent with other findings in social psychology (Nisbett & Ross 1980; Nisbett & Wilson 1977) and in neuropsychology, such as cases of agnosia and amnesia, in which there are similar dissociations between subjects' behaviors and their report of their own psychological…”
ResultDoes the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00076512 · Cited by 8,743
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
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Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state.
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Cited by
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 · Cited by 4,476
Empathy: its ultimate and proximate bases
Preston, S. D., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2002) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x02000018 · Cited by 4,126
On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism
Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.114.4.864 · Cited by 4,069
The functional architecture of human empathy
Decety, J., & Jackson, P. L. (2004) · Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews · doi:10.1177/1534582304267187 · Cited by 3,407
Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading
Gallese, V (1998) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(98)01262-5 · Cited by 3,201
Metadata
- Authors
- Gopnik, A.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1993-03
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-14
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2108247678
- Cited by
- 967
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 68.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
