POVERTY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION SPENDING: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A large body of literature has emphasized the elite capture of democratic institutions as the explanation for the low levels of spending on public education in many low-income democracies. This paper provides an alternative to that longstanding hypothesis. Motivated by new cross-country facts and evidence from Brazilian municipalities, we hypothesize that many democratic developing countries might invest less in public education spending because poor decisive voters prefer the government to allocate resources elsewhere. One possible explanation is that low-income voters could instead favor redistributive programs that increase their incomes in the short run, such as cash transfers. To test for this possibility, we design and implement an experimental survey and an incentivized choice experiment in Brazil. The findings from both interventions support our hypothesis.
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Citations
Cites
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“Finally, Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2012) argue that scarcity itself can lead to short-run biases.”
BackgroundIndividual discount rates and the purchase and utilization of energy-using durables
Hausman, J. A. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003318 · Cited by 1,372 · cited 1×
“…studies have argued that the poor might have higher discount rates, and more harmful self-control problems than higher-income individuals do (see Hausman, 1979, Lawrance, 1991, and Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002, for high discount rates, and Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2009, and Bernheim, Ray…”
BackgroundPowerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias? *
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Background
Cited by
Tax Me, but Spend Wisely? Sources of Public Finance and Government Accountability
Gadenne, L. (2017) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20150509 · Cited by 165
“This would lead to tax revenues being spent more on education infrastructure if taxpayers favor education spending more than (poorer) non taxpayers, in line with evidence in Bursztyn (2013) that middle-income individuals demand more education spending than low-income individuals in Brazil.”
ResultShocking behavior: random wealth in antebellum georgia and human capital across generations
Bleakley, H., & Ferrie, J. (2016) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjw014 · Cited by 125
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Voter Preferences, Electoral Promises, and the Composition of Public Spending
Keefer, P., Scartascini, C., & Vlaicu, R. (2020) · doi:10.18235/0002434 · Cited by 10
Income Contingency and the Electorate's Support for Tuition
Lergetporer, P., & Woessmann, L. (2022) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4011508 · Cited by 7
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Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Bursztyn, L.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2016-06-29
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1101-1128
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2185566844
- Cited by
- 83
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 12.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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