Cited by 4,810Political Conflict and GovernancePolitical Theory and DemocracyPolitics and Society in Latin America

Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James A.·2005·Cambridge University Press eBooks

Abstract

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.

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Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9780511510809

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171 of 171 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Economic variables provide partial answers to why governance in some states and societies is more authoritarian than in others.

    “Economic variables—including the overall availability of economic resources and the manner in which those resources are distributed—provide partial answers to that question [3], [4], [5], [6].”

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Authors
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Venue
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Published
2005-12-19
OpenAlex
W1823439115
Cited by
4,810
References
171
Citations by year
2026: 94 · 2025: 285 · 2024: 201 · 2023: 158 · 2022: 225 · 2021: 223 · 2020: 360 · 2019: 365 · 2018: 246 · 2017: 243 · 2016: 273 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 280 · 2013: 270 · 2012: 283
FWCI
166.05
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Politics and Society in Latin America
Keywords
dictatorship, democratization, democratic consolidation, elites, social disorder, revolution, repression, credible commitment, civil society, political institutions, economic crisis, economic inequality, globalization, political economy

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