The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis
Open accessAbstract
We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Bank governance, regulation and risk taking
Laeven, L. A., & Levine, R. E. (2008) · Cited by 3,269
In Search of Distress RiskPreprint
Szilagyi, J., Hilscher, J., & Campbell, J. Y. (2008) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2,246
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
Hellmann, T. F., Murdock, K. C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.147 · Cited by 2,088
The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited
BOYD, J. H., & DE NICOLÓ, G. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00763.x · Cited by 2,084
Merton, R. C. (1977) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(77)90015-2 · Cited by 1,920
Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in BankingPreprint
Keeley, M. C. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,723
How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?
Berger, A. N., & Bouwman, C. H. S. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.008 · Cited by 1,684
Self-citationThe use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels
Core, J., & Guay, W. (1999) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1 · Cited by 1,456
Cited by
Do ESG strategies enhance bank stability during financial turmoil? Evidence from Europe
Chiaramonte, L., Dreassi, A., Girardone, C., & Piserà, S. (2022) · The European Journal of Finance · doi:10.1080/1351847x.2021.1964556 · Cited by 389
Ahmad, N., Mobarek, A., & Raid, M. (2023) · Cogent Business & Management · doi:10.1080/23311975.2023.2167548 · Cited by 69
Metadata
- Authors
- BERGER, A. N., IMBIEROWICZ, B., & RAUCH, C.
- Venue
- Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-05-17
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 729-770
- ISSN
- 0022-2879 (ISSN-L)
- 1538-4616
- OpenAlex
- W3124102702
- Cited by
- 323
- References
- 56
- FWCI
- 38.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/jmcb.12316
- The paper
- BERGER, A. N., IMBIEROWICZ, B., & RAUCH, C. (2016). The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12316
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.