Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 65 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Professional lobbyists are among the most experienced, knowledgeable, and strategic actors one can find in the everyday practice of politics. Nonetheless, their behavioral patterns often appear anomalous when viewed in the light of existing theories. We revisit these anomalies in search of an alternative theory. We model lobbying not as exchange (vote buying) or persuasion (informative signaling) but as a form of legislative subsidy—a matching grant of policy information, political intelligence, and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators. The proximate political objective of this strategy is not to change legislators' minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives. The theory is simple in form, realistic in its principal assumptions, and counterintuitive in its main implications. Empirically, the model renders otherwise anomalous regularities comprehensible and predictable. In a later section, we briefly bring preferences back in, examining the important but relatively uncommon conditions under which preference-centered lobbying should occur.
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Cited by
A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics
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“From this standpoint, users’ responsibility is to balance various kinds of information (e.g., see the typologies of information from Hall and Deardorff 2006; Peterson 1995; Phillips and Phillips 1984; Sabatier 1978).”
BackgroundCampaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment
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Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying
de Figueiredo, J. M., & Richter, B. K. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135308 · Cited by 367
Metadata
- Authors
- HALL, R. L., & DEARDORFF, A. V.
- Affiliations
- University of Michigan (US)
- ORCID
- DEARDORFF, ALAN V.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2006-02
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 69-84
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2032228748
- Cited by
- 1,172
- References
- 65
- Citations by year
- 2026: 51 · 2025: 88 · 2024: 129 · 2023: 101 · 2022: 75 · 2021: 92 · 2020: 66 · 2019: 89 · 2018: 72 · 2017: 42 · 2016: 48 · 2015: 33 · 2014: 50 · 2013: 49 · 2012: 46
- FWCI
- 59.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- lobbying, matching grants, legislative behavior, vote buying
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