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Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy

HALL, RICHARD L., DEARDORFF, ALAN V. · 2006 · American Political Science Review

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 65 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Professional lobbyists are among the most experienced, knowledgeable, and strategic actors one can find in the everyday practice of politics. Nonetheless, their behavioral patterns often appear anomalous when viewed in the light of existing theories. We revisit these anomalies in search of an alternative theory. We model lobbying not as exchange (vote buying) or persuasion (informative signaling) but as a form of legislative subsidy—a matching grant of policy information, political intelligence, and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators. The proximate political objective of this strategy is not to change legislators' minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives. The theory is simple in form, realistic in its principal assumptions, and counterintuitive in its main implications. Empirically, the model renders otherwise anomalous regularities comprehensible and predictable. In a later section, we briefly bring preferences back in, examining the important but relatively uncommon conditions under which preference-centered lobbying should occur.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s0003055406062010

Cites

62 of 62 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 62 references

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. Browne William P .1995.Cultivating Congress: Constituencies, Issues, and Interests in Agricultural Policymaking Lawrence, KS:University of Kansas Press.
  2. Baumgartner Frank R. , Jeffrey M. Berry , Marie Hojnacki , Beth Leech , and David Kimball .2002.“Organized Interests and Issue Definition in Policy Debates.”In Interest Group Politics, 6th Edition,eds. Allan Cigler and Burdett Loomis .Washington, DC:CQ Press.
  3. Varian Hal R .1992.Microeconomic Analysis.3rd edition.New York:Norton.
  4. Shepsle Kenneth A .1978.The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Committee Assignments in the Modern House.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
  5. Kollman Ken .1998.Outside Lobbying.Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.
  6. Evans C. Lawrence .1991.Leadership in Committees.Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press.
  7. 1993. Cox and McCubbins .Legislative Leviathan.Berkeley:University of California Press.
  8. Evans C. Lawrence .1989.“Influence in Congressional Committees.”In Congressional Politics.ed. Christopher C. Deering .Chicago:The Dorsey Press.
  9. Whiteman David .1995.Communication in Congress.Lawrence:Kansas University Press.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
HALL, R. L., & DEARDORFF, A. V.
Affiliations
University of Michigan (US)
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
2006-02
Volume
100
Issue
1
Pages
69-84
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W2032228748
Cited by
1,172
References
65
Citations by year
2026: 51 · 2025: 88 · 2024: 129 · 2023: 101 · 2022: 75 · 2021: 92 · 2020: 66 · 2019: 89 · 2018: 72 · 2017: 42 · 2016: 48 · 2015: 33 · 2014: 50 · 2013: 49 · 2012: 46
FWCI
59.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
lobbying, matching grants, legislative behavior, vote buying

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0003055406062010
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HALL, R. L., & DEARDORFF, A. V. (2006). Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055406062010

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