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Philosophy Makes No Progress, So What Is the Point of It?
Abstract
Philosophy makes no progress. It fails to do so in the way science and mathematics make progress. By “no progress” is meant that there is no successive advance of a well‐established body of knowledge—no views are definitively established or definitively refuted. Yet philosophers often talk and act as if the subject makes progress, and that its point and value lies in its doing so, while in fact they also approach the subject in ways that clearly contradict any claim to progress. This article presents evidence for, and a theoretical explanation of, the view that philosophy makes no progress, concluding with an account of what philosophy is and what the point and value of it is. Philosophy should not be shy about being what it is, nor should it pretend to be what it is not. What it is should be reflected in philosophizing and the way it is taught.
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“In this sense, as Shand ( ) implies, the same ' semantic ambiguity ' that prevents philosophy from achieving the kinds of resolution we see in mathematics, actually shapes the conditions for philosophical problems.”
From ‘The view from above’: a theory of comparative philosophy (2020) · cites this paper as Shand (2017)
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‘The view from above’: a theory of comparative philosophy
FRAZIER, J. (2020) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412519000362 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Shand, J.
- Affiliations
- The Open University (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Shand, John
- Venue
- Metaphilosophy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2017-04
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 284-295
- ISSN
- 0026-1068 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9973
- OpenAlex
- W2609863465
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2
- FWCI
- 5.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Metaphilosophy (publishedVersion)
- Open Research Online - ORO (The Open University) (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Thought and Analysis
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Keywords
- progress in philosophy, philosophy versus science, value of philosophy, nature of philosophy, epistemology of philosophy, philosophy education
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