Cited by 36Evolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and History of Science

The enduring enigma of reason

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Dutilh Novaes, Catarina·2018·Mind & Language

Abstract

In The Enigma of Reason, Mercier and Sperber (M&S) present and defend their interactionist account of reason. In this piece, I discuss briefly the points of agreement between M&S and myself and, more extensively, the points of disagreement, most of which pertain to details of the evolutionary components of their account. I discuss in particular the purported modular nature of reason; their account of myside bias as an optimum/adaptation; and the claim that reason thus construed must be an individual‐level and not a group‐level adaptation. In the final section, I offer brief considerations on an alternative account of reasoning, where the focus is on how sociocultural environments may tune the social production and evaluation of arguments.

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  • Since individuals within their social groups depend on their reputation to find collaborators, anticipating one's audience's responses should be and have been more adaptive than having a confirmation bias.

    “Since individuals within their social groups depend on their reputation so as to find collaborators, anticipating one's audience's responses should be and have been more adaptive than having a confirmation bias (ibid).”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Dutilh Novaes 2018

    Section 3.2 argues that anticipating an audience’s objections seems plausibly more adaptive than myside bias, and connects the issue to reputation. It does not establish that this was historically more adaptive or say that reputation matters specifically for finding collaborators; the claim states those points more firmly and specifically than the paper does. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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  • Confirmation bias makes people less able to anticipate and adequately respond to their interlocutor's point of view.

    “In fueling one-sided information processing to support one's own view, the bias makes people less able to anticipate and adequately respond to their interlocutor's point of view (Dutilh Novaes 2018: 520).”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Dutilh Novaes 2018

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Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. Brandom, R. (1994). Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  2. Dutilh Novaes, C. (2013). A dialogical account of deductive reasoning as a case study for how culture shapes cognition. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 13, 459-482.
  3. Dutilh Novaes, C. (2015). A dialogical, multi-agent account of the normativity of logic, 69(4), 587-609.
  4. Henrich, J. (2015). The secret of our success. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  5. Henrich, J., Heine, S. J. & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 61-83.
  6. Heyes, C. (2012). Grist and mills: on the cultural origins of cultural learning. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 367 (1599), 2181-2191.
  7. Levine, T. R. (2010). A few transparent liars: Explaining 54% accuracy in deception detection experiments. In C. Salmon (Ed.), Com- munication yearbook (Vol. 34, pp. 40-61). New York: Sage.
  8. Levine, T. (2014). Truth-default theory (TDT): A theory of human deception and deception detection. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 33, 378-392.
  9. Tomasello, M. (2014). A natural history of human thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  10. Vygotsky, L. (1931). History of the development of the higher mental functions. In The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky (Vol. 4, pp. 1-251). New York: Plenum Press.

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Authors
Dutilh Novaes, C.
Affiliations
Faculty of Philosophy University of Groningen Groningen Netherlands
Venue
Mind & Language
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2018-08-22
Volume
33
Issue
5
Pages
513-524
ISSN
  • 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0017
OpenAlex
W2888327848
Cited by
36
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 1
FWCI
3.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Mind & Language (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
Keywords
myside bias, sociocultural context, argumentation

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