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A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection
Abstract
Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature of their referents in a partial and incomplete manner, a posteriori physicalism is safe.
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It is fallacious to infer a property's inapplicability to consciousness from its introspective unavailability.
“and it is fallacious to infer a property’s inapplicability to consciousness from its introspective unavailability (see, e.g., Williford, 2007; Elpidorou, 2016).”
From The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood (2018) · cites this paper as Elpidorou, 2016
Citations
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The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
Williford, K., Bennequin, D., Friston, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571 · Cited by 78
“Its scope is correspondingly widened by what is phenomenologically unavailable; and it is fallacious to infer a property’s inapplicability to consciousness from its introspective unavailability (see, e.g., Williford, 2007; Elpidorou, 2016).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Elpidorou, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Louisville (US)
- Corresponding author
- Elpidorou, Andreas
- ORCID
- Elpidorou, Andreas
- Venue
- Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-03-31
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 474-500
- ISSN
- 0031-5621 (ISSN-L)
- 0279-0750
- 1468-0114
- OpenAlex
- W1821038517
- Cited by
- 23
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 4
- FWCI
- 5.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Pacific philosophical quarterly (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- self-reflection, phenomenal concepts, phenomenal states, phenomenal consciousness, physicalism
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