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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness

Byrne, Alex, Levine, Joseph · 2002 · The Philosophical Review

Abstract

Conscious experience presents a deep puzzle. On the one hand, a fairly robust materialism must be true in order to explain how it is that conscious events causally interact with non-conscious, physical events. On the other hand, we cannot explain how physical phenomena give rise to conscious experience. In this wide-ranging study, Joseph Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the explanatory the fact that we can't explain the nature of phenomenal experience in terms of its physical realization. He presents a careful argument that there is such a gap, and, after providing intriguing analyses of virtually all existing theories of consciousness, shows that recent attempts to close it fall short of the mark. Levine concludes that in the foreseeable future consciousness will remain a mystery.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.2307/1556435

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Metadata

Authors
Byrne, A., & Levine, J.
Venue
The Philosophical Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
2002-10
Volume
111
Issue
4
Pages
594
ISSN
0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3161553380
Cited by
266
References
0
Citations by year
2024: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 12
FWCI
12.49
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
consciousness, mind-body problem, phenomenal experience, materialism, physicalism, explanatory gap, theory of consciousness, causal interaction

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1556435
The paper
Byrne, A., & Levine, J. (2002). Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/1556435

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.